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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
All c i v i l i z e d s o c i e t i e s are cha rac te r i sed with 
some s o r t of c r imina l j u s t i c e systems cons i s t en t to the 
i d e a l s and va lues they che r i sh , x^part from viewing the 
notion of j u s t i c e as something time bo*nd and cu l tu re Jt-' 
oriented/ the governments in these so'bieties tend to 
objec t i fy tne codes of c r imina l law and iden t i fy the 
d ispensa t ion of cr iminal j u s t i c e with the enforcement 
of t h i s c r imina l law and i t s procedures. The cr iminal 
penology and the procedures t h a t i t seeks to p resc r ibe 
have to be i n s p i r e d by high i d e a l s of individual secur i ty 
1 
and soc ia l cohesion, i f not soc i a l s o l i d a r i t y . 
In a c i v i l i z e d soc ie ty , j u s t i c e i s regarded as 
a touchstone for good and bad. The concept of j u s t i c e 
in human h i s t o r y through a l l t imes and a l l cl imes has 
been r e l a t i n g around the d e f i n i t i o n of the term 'Due' , 
P la to envisaged i t as a Notion of 'du ty ' very mucn 
i m p l i c i t in h i s doctrixie of E t h i c a l man and h i s "expanded 
doc io -e th ica l organism" c a l l e d the S ta te , The Romans 
being i m p e r i a l i s t conquerors i n t e r e s t e d in administering 
a ramsnackle and po lyg lo t empire added conventional and 
r a t i o n a l dimensions to the theory of law which l a t e r 
developed as an adjunct to the theory of ' Jus na tura le 
1. Sharma, P,Z>, 'Po l ice and Criminal J u s t i c e Adminis-
t r a t i o n in I n d i a , ? , 1 
and 'Jus Jentium*. The entire rubric of Anglo -
Saxon Jurisprudence from which emana'tes the nation 
of 'Rule of Law* in the West has developed around 
this basic concept of 'Liberty Loving Rational Man', 
whom the authority of the State should not harass 
2 
and still less punish, vmless proved guilty. 
Police in all political systems has been and 
remains to be the central agency of criminal justice 
system, no matter how the concept is defined in the 
respective frameworks of law. Historically, police 
nas been responsible for the enforcement of law and 
main tenance or order. Law and order being somewhat 
synonymous in the developed societies of the West 
allowed the police to take care of crime and vice 
which represented the violation or non enforcement of 
law. rts the philosophy of aemocratic liberlism and 
its concomitant aotion or Civil liberties got streng-
then in the West, judiciary emerged on the scene as a 
guardian of the Constitutional law and defender of 
fundamental rights of the citizens. Yet, unlike the 
police in colonial world, the west did not question 
the primary role of the police i.e. to protect the 
citizens, which was another name of proper law enforce-
ment. Although the Western history the Institution of 
2. Ibid., p. 11 
Police has been viewed as a conscience keeper of 
society. Even the worst critics of police in the 
west when they detest police brutalities and condemn 
police ways/ they admit and conceds that police as an 
agency is more important than judiciary and much of 
the quality of criminal justice is noting but levels 
3 
of police performance. 
In modern conditions/ and in particular in large 
societies which have undertaken m e positive task of 
providing for the welfare of the community, it is a 
necessary and indeed, inevitable practice for the Legis-
latiire to delegate power to the Executive to make rules 
having the character of legislature. But such sxobordi-
nate rule making, however, extensive it may in fact be, 
should have a defined extent, purpose and procedure by 
which it is brought into effect. A total delegation of 
legislative power is therefore,in-admissible. To ensure 
that the extent, purpose and procedure appropriate to 
Police working are observed, it was desired that it 
should be ultimately controlled by a judicial tribunal 
independent of the executive authority responsible for 
the making of the subordinate legislation. 
3. packer, H.L. The Police and the Commvmity,Stanford 
Law Review, Vol. 22 (1969),P. 1317 
Judicial control of police regulations may be 
greatly faceilitated by the clear and precise state-
ment in the parent legislation of the purposes which 
4 
such subordinate legislation is intended to serve. 
State of Uttar Pradesh like other states has under 
rule-iTiaking power enacted, U.P. Police i^eguiations under 
Indian Police ^ct 1861, to regulate the police functions; 
to maintain peace and security, to apprehend ana to 
collect and communicate intelligence. 
After independence neither the Central Government 
nor state governments have even seriously made efforts 
to point out as to wnat are those police regulations 
which have the potentialities, to hit the Fundamental 
Rights guaranteed by part III of the Constitution, ^s 
we know that when these police regulations were made, 
we did not have either the constitution or the Fundamental 
Rights. Hence neither the makers of the Police Regulation, 
nor the regulations themselves were under any obligation 
to see that they should not valid Fundamental Rights, 
so their continuence and existence upto Jan. 26,1950,was 
all right, but after Jan. 26, 195i^ , the day constitution 
came into force^ State governments under the democratic 
constitution were bound to bring the police Regulations 
4. Sharma, P.i:., Police and Criminal justice 
Administration in India, PP. 64-65 
in compliance with the constitutional provisions. But 
no such effort was made. 
What was transferred, was the power to administer 
the country, from the White rulers to Brown rulers, 
whom also the police paraphernalia including regulations 
suited well. Though the congressmen, were themselves, 
victims of these British Police Regulations, even then 
they thought it proper to rule, the new democratic 
country with the help of the colonial Police Act and 
Regulations. 
The deconian and archaic attitude of the Police 
Regulations had been rightly detected by the Supreme 
5 6 
Coxirt of India in Kharak Singh and Govinda cases. The 
S.C. has unhesitatingly emphasized and eloborated the 
concept of life and personal liberty. The right to 
privacy has been almost accepted as a judicial erainiated 
right as part and partial of personal liberty guaranteed 
by Art. 21 of our Constitution, The S.C, has catego-
rically declared regulation 236 of U.P. Police Regula-
tions, authorising the police to make domiciliary visits, 
as unconstitutional. In Govinda, the 3,C, has gone even 
to the extent of suggesting the state to bring their 
5. Kharak Singh v. State of U.P.,AIR 1963,S.C, 1295 
b. Govinda v. Stateofjl.P., AIR 1975 S.C, 1378 
police regulations in tune with the cxirrent democratic 
tender of the Constitution. 
This dissertation is an attempt to examine 
and high light those regulations made thereby, which 
directly if followed as accordingly, ultimately 
violate liberties of aa individual. Liberty is the 
base for democratic existence, so it becomes necessary 
to expose those rules which violate the civil liberties. 
Much water has gone down under the bridges of 
Jamuna since the pronouncement of Govinda in 1975, 
but no attempt has been made by the Law Commission of 
India nor by any State Government in bringing the 
Police Regulations in txine with the philosophy of this 
country. The judicial suggestion given by the S.C, 
in Kharak Singh and Govinaa^ has gone in vain without 
yeilding any fruitful result. Still the Police Regula-
tions are rufling the roost and they are very much on 
the statute book empowering the police to deal with the 
citizens most cherished and basic rights carelessly 
and incavalier manner. The fate of the Constitution 
would be doomed if they are placed at the mercy of the 
police in any country. Keeping all thesethings in view 
the topic for dissertation covering the Police Regxilation 
and civil libertieS/ has been worked out. 
The whole dissertation has been splited 
in five Chapters. Chapter I deals witn the various 
concepts viz. liberty, limitation of liberty/ civil 
liberty,welfare state*natural justice, duty to up-
hold individual liberty, police behavioxir in societies 
and human rights. 
The growth and development of Civil liberties, 
in iimerica and Britain vis-a-vis tne police power 
have been discussed in light of 'due process' and 
'common law' in Chapter II. 
Chapter III discusses the 'Life and personal 
iioerty*, as the Supreme Court has discussed in its 
various decisions. 
Chapter IV deals with Right to privacy, as 
has been accepted as part and partial of personal.Hber 
In Kharak Singh the Supreme Court held certain U.P, 
PQlice Regulations as violative of this right. 
rin attempt has been made to point out those 
Police Regulations which come in conflict with civil 
liberties in Chapter V , 
In the end of dissertarial journey, an attempt 
has been made to make certain suggestions which form 
the substance of concluding part of the dissertation. 
CHAPTER - I 
HEAlvillsG Sc DEFINITIONS OF 
CERTAIN CONCEPT3 
l-iEAx^'ING OF LIBERTY - LII-IITATIOK OF LIBERTY -
RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY- CIVIL LIBERTY - -imLFJ>RE STATS • 
CONCEPT OF NATURAL JUSTICE - NATURAL JUSTICE WHEN 
INVOKED- DUTY TO UPHOLD INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY - POLICE-
ROLE OF POLICE IN SOCIETY - POLICE BEHAVIOUR TOWARDS 
PUBLIC- LIBERTIES u HUMAN RIGHTS. 
I I I I I I I I I I I I 
8 
i'leaninq Of Libert.yi 
Liberty does not mean all good things or the 
absence of all evils. It is true that to be free may-
mean freedom to s-carve, to make costly mistakes, or to 
run mortal risks. In the sense in which we use the 
tenn, the penniless vagabond who lives precariously by 
consranu improvisation is indeed free rather than the 
conscriptea soldier with ail his security and rela-cive 
coafort. But if liberty may therefore not. always seem 
preferable to other goods* it is a disi^inctive good that 
needs a dis-cinctive name and though "political liberty" 
and "inner liberty" are J.ong esrabiished alternative uses 
of the rerm, which with a lit-ie care, may be employed 
without causing confusion. 
While tne uses of liberty axe many, liberty is 
one. Liberties appear only when liberty is lacking; 
they are the special privileges and exemptions that groups 
and individuals may acquire, while tne rest are more or 
less unfree. Historically, tne patn to liberty has led 
through the achievement of particular liberties. But 
tnat one should be allowed to do specific thing is not 
liberty, though it may be called " a liberty"; and while 
liberty is compatible with not being allowed to do spe-
cific tnings, it does nor. exist, if one needs permission 
for most of what one can do. The difference between 
liberty and liberties is that which exists between a 
condition in whicn all is permitted that is not prohi-
bited by general rules and one in which all is prohibited 
1 
that is nor explicitly permitted. 
itoscoe Povind is of the view that in the nine-
teenth centxiry there was no difficulty in answering the 
question, what is meant "liberty"? Kant's idea of the 
IdLberty of each - the free self assertion of each -
limited only by the like liberty of all, subject only 
to the possibility of like free-self-assertion by all, 
was generally accepted. Liberty was a condition in 
which free exercise of the will was restrained free 
exercise of the will was restrained only so far as neces-
sary to secure a harmonious coexistence of the free will 
2 
of each and the free will of ail others. 
Justice Learned Hand of the U.S. Supreme Court 
deals liberty in the following words: 
"Liberty lies in tne hearts of men and women; 
when it denies either no constitution, no law, no court 
1. Hayek, F.A., The Constitution of Liberty,p. 18-19 
2. Found, uoscoe. The development of Constitutional 
Guarantees of liberty,p.1 
10 
can save it/ no constitution/ no iaw# no court can even 
do much to help it while it lies there needs no constitu-
tion, no law, no court to safe it, what then is the spirit 
of liijerty? I can not define it. I can tell you of my own 
faith. The spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not 
too s\ire what it is right, the spirit which seeks to iinder-
stand the minds of other men and women; the spirit of 
liberty is the spirit which weigns their interests along 
wide its own without bias; the spirit of liberty remembers 
that not even a sparrow falls to earth \inheeded; the spirit 
of liberty is the spirit of Him who, nearly two thousand 
years ago, tought mankind that lession it has never learned 
but has never quite forgotten; that there may be a kindom 
where the least shall be heard and considered side by side 
3 
with tne greatest." 
Limitation Of Liberty; 
With regard to the limitation of liberty, it is super-
iicidlly attractive to contend that there should be equal 
liberty all arround, or that it should be cxirtailed equally. 
The matter is not so simple, however; whether minorities 
or individuals are allowed certain liberties at all depends, 
not on equality, but on the priority of values. 
3, Justice, S. Mohan, 'The S^ fwing of the Pendulum from 
procedure to Jue Process. The Madras Law Journal 
(1987) Vol. I, p. 30-31 
11 
Apart from government there are other kinds of 
liberties to exercise powers, courts may some times 
protect individual against the abuse of power by the 
executive; but certain other liberties to abuse 
power can only be dealt with by government. 
o: 
£na to dictatorship is the permissive society, 
wnich allows liberties to the point where society becomes 
fragmented, slogans such as liberty 'tolerance' 'reaso-
nableness', are so emotively charged tnat many people 
become obsessed with being thought 'illiberal', intole-
rance' or 'unreasonable' whicn colours tneir approach. 
If every one insisted on complete liberty ox action in 
using tne highway, traffic would seize up; so certain 
limitations on liberty are imposed in the interests of 
all. Likewise, limitations have to be imposed on various 
other kincs of liberties in order to hold kinds of 
liberties in order to hold society together. Obviously 
4 
there should be no liberty to murder, maim , steal etc. 
Restraint Of Liberty: 
Restraint of liberty is a more deep- seated problem. 
In tne first place liberty stands behind the very exer-
cise ot power whatever kind of power one has, there is 
4, Dias, R,W,*M., Jurisprudence, P. 109 -110 
12 
usually a liberty to exercise it or not. The danger 
of abuse has to be met by abolishing the liberty and 
replacing it with an externally imposed duty not to 
exercise that power; or tnrougn voluntary restraint in 
its exercise. Secondly, at the other end of tne scale 
and removed from oppression is permissiveness/ which gives 
free rein to liberties of action. The giving of equal 
liberties could reach the point of anarchy and the ques-
tion tnen is how liberties, which are distructive if 
exercised abusively, are to be restrained. Finally, 
even where the law limits liberty by replacing it with a 
auty not to do some act so that the individual no longer 
has any liberty at law. He still has an inner moral 
liberty to obey the law or to disobey. Law here reaches 
its IdLmits, For restraint on liberty, beyond this point 
can only derive from self-restraint and self discipline, 
and all that law can ever hope to do so is to help in 
direct ways to promote the necessary moral sense of 
obligation. 
Civil Liberty; 
black's Law Dictionary defines civil liberty as, 
"personal natural rights guaranteed and protected by 
constitution, e.g. freedom of speech, press,freedom from 
discrimination etc. Body of law dealing with natural 
5, Ibid., p. 117-118 
3 
liberties, shorn of excess which invade equal rights 
of others. Constitutionally they are restraints on 
6 
government. 
Generally speaking there are two kinds of law 
(i; International law* and i2) Municipal law? Municipal 
law is also called civil law. By civil law is meant, 
the law of tne land. It is enforced by the courts of 
the State. In jurisprudence tne word 'law* is used to 
mean mainly this kind of law. Salmond says that, this 
is law in the strictest and original sense of the terra, 
all other applications of the term being derived from 
7 
this analogical extension". 
It is clear that civil law meant, law enforceable 
for civilians in a state. And the liberties which are 
regulate by these laws are known as civil liberties, 
civil liberties are strongly required to be protected 
in a modern state i.e. a welfare.state. 
Conceptual understanding of life and personal 
liberty as guaranteed in Art. 21 of the Indian Consti-
tution and as has been interpreted and developed by the 
S^upreme Court, through it's decisional work passes 
through three phases. The first phase begins with A.K. 
8 
Gopalan v. State of i<tadras, which can easily be described 
6. Eiack's Law Dictionary, p. 223 
7. Tripathi; Bijai r.'arain i-iani. An Introduction to 
Jurisprudence, p. 80 
8. A.I.R. lySO S.C, 27 
14 
as narrow or limited phase of personal liberty in India. 
In this case personal liberty was said to mean only 
liberty relating to, or conc€irQing the person or body 
of the individual/ and in this sense court adopted 
limited pedantic and narrow sense of liberty. 
In second phase, the Supreme Court has of course 
made a little bit advancement from its narrow approach 
towards liberty but has not yet left its conservative 
9 
approach. In Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. it was held 
that term 'life• means something more than animal exis-
tence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends 
to all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed. 
10 
In Govind v. State of 'A,P,, it was saj.d that right to 
privacy is an independent right, and not absolute. 
Interestingly in this case regulations were held consti-
tutional, while similar police regulations were held 
unconstitutional in Kharak Singh. In Satwanr Singh v. 
11 
Assistant passport Officer, iNew Delhi, the expression 
•liberty' was considered a comprehensive term as it also 
takes in the right of locomotion - to go where and when 
12 
one pleaseSr A.P.M. Jabalpur v. S. Shukla was pathetic 
judicial response of judiciary to personal liberty, where 
it was said that no one has local-standi to go to the 
9. AIR 1963 SC 1295 
10.AIR 1975 SC 1379 
ll.AIR 1967 SC 1836 
12.AIR 1976 SC 1207 
15 
Coxirt for enforcement of this right suspended by the 
Presidential order under Art. 359, 
This second phase of personal liberty in India 
can be said to be neither narrow and limited nor liberal 
and progressive, but is in-between. 
The third phase begins with Maneka Gandhi v, 
13 
Union of India, whicn came up before the Supreme Court 
after 19 months of emergency. The ending of emergency 
in 1977 was rejoyced by the Indian people and was cele-
bera-ced as a second independence from the terrorical rule 
of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. The Supreme Courts liberal and 
progressive approach toward*s personal liberty in Art.21/ 
was nothing but a judicial compensation, to be made, on 
account of the judicial loss caused by the Supreme Coxirt 
itself to 'personal liberty* in A.D.iM. Jabalpur case. 
The Court has demonstrated distinct approach to the concept 
of personal liberty in A.D«i-i. Jabalpur and x-ianeka Gandhi 
court gave a serious blow to the ambit and scope of 
personal liberty in A.D.H. Jabalpur, on account of emer-
gency, and the liberal progressive approach in Maneka 
Gandhi. 
13. A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597 
16 
WELFARE STATE; 
A h\indred years ago, the responsibility of 
the state was very narrowly interpreted. It only 
provided the bare necessities of the cunmunity as a 
whole, such as defence against aggression and the 
maintenance of order. The law did little more than 
provide a defence for "rights of property" and "freedom 
of contract". The social revolution of toflay has 
changed all that. It has metamorphosed the Police 
14 
State into the Welfare State. 
The philosophy envisaged by the laissez fair 
state of the nineteenth cent;iry had manifested itself 
in the theory of individualism which resulted into 
minimum Government control* inaximxam free enterprise 
and contractual freedom. The laissez fair state was 
characterised as the "Police" state or the "law and 
order" state and its role was conceived to be negative. 
The functions of the state were limited primarily to 
defence of the country, external affairs and maintenance 
of law and order. But later it was realised that the 
state should take interest in ameliorating the condi-
tions of the poor/ preventing the exploition of the 
masses and distributing the wealth of the country 
14. Kass^lmani, A,p, "Administrative Law in India,P. 1 
17 
amongst ail which was concentrated only in a few hands. 
This changed tne concept of state from individualism 
to collectivism or from iaissez fair to welfare or from 
negative to positive or from police to welfare. Thus 
tne concept of the State in the twentieth century has 
now come to stay as the welfare state. 
The twentieth centviry has been an enormous 
growth in the responsibilities of the State^ covering 
almost all aspects of economic, social as well as 
political and cultural life. This necessitated the 
devolution of power to the officials of are ever growing 
public service in many fields which intimately affect 
15 
tne daily lives of ordinary citizens . The State today 
exercise a degree of control over the individual for 
exceeding in scope and intensity/ than in any other 
period in history. 
Concept of Natural Justice: 
Lord I'lougham/ J,, points that "justice is a 
very elaborate conceptions. It is a developing process 
with the civilization and differs in different coun-
Ifa 
tries" Prof. Potter is more pertinent when he says 
17 
tnat justice is a facet of truth. 
15. Singh/ Jr.S.S, 'Administration of Natural Justice 
in India, P. 12 
16. Maclian v . V^torkers Union C1929) 1 Ch. 602 
17. ^atiaiak/G. s . , quoted Pro£ . P o t t e r , i n J u s t i c e for 
the Common *ian(1964) , 62 
18 
The etnical natxire of justice is much emphasised 
in tae fields of theology and philosophy. This justice 
is conceived as natural law. It is understood as moral 
instict common to all men „ or as a devine dictate 
written on their nearts. It was, thus, of a vague 
character and there was a great difficulty in its rea-
lization in tiie concrete rules of conduct, dispute 
often arose as to tne actual content of this natviral law, 
Neverthless/ tne recognition of tne existence of such a 
18 
law gave a common purpose to juristic thought. It is 
realised that natural law is a powerful influence in 
maintaining the ideal of justice in the form of moral 
commandment of life, 
Natxaral law is synonymous with moral law. It 
refers to the principles of right and wrong. Scrutton, 
L.J, accepts natural law as such because it dispenses 
justice. " I am sure it is justice. It is probably the 
19 law for that reason" he saysj 
The concept of natxoral justice, was differently 
understood by different writers and lawyers at different 
systems. Some regarded natural justice as devine law; 
others took it as a form of jus gentium or the common law 
18, Fenwick Charles o, , International Law, (2na ed,-
1961) 54 
19. Gard ina r v . Heading a 9 2 8 ; 2 K,B, 284 
1S 
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of nations. j^ad others regarded it as synonymous 
with theaexpressions such as: 'natural law*, universal 
22 
law,eternal law', the laws of God 'universal Justice 
23 
natural equity, the sxibstantial requirement of justice, 
24 25 
t h e e s s e n c e of j u s t i c e s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e , fundamenta: 
26 27 
j u s t i c e t n e o r i n c i p l e of B r i t i s h j u s t i c e , ' t h e f i r s t 
28 29 
principles of justice, 'rational justice, devine 
31 
j u s t i c e , ' t n e e s s e n t i a l p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e . 
Recently, the phrase 'natxxral j u s t i c e ' has 
acquired a g rea t importance in the j u d i c i a l i n t e rp r e t a -
t ion a r i s i n g out of the dec i s ions of t r i buna l s and 
admin i s t r a t ive bodies . Besides, i t may also claim 
s t a t u t o r y approval . In the process the cour t s nave 
expanded t h e i r learnec cons ide ra t i ons . In xsie cosmic 
sense the term ' n a t u r e ' denotes tne l i f e force. In 
tne human sensfe, however, i t aenotes tne innernature of 
man. L i t e r a l l y speaking ' n a t u r e ' implies the innate 
qua l i ty or tendency of tn ings or ob jec t s . 
2 0 . i jowr ik . J u s t i c e A c c o r d i n g t o E n g l i s h Common Lawyers 
Cnaptt . 4 q u o t e d by D r . S . S . S i n g h i n « . d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
of i .<atural ous'clce. 
2 1 . Cooper v . Wandsworth B o a r d o f - o r k s (1S63) 14,C.i5. 
i.N. 3 . 180 
2 2 . Lrew v . Dre\i (.1885) 2 Macq. 13 
2 3 . Ram CoOxTiar v . Mac queen t l 8 7 2 ) I.-ri, S u p p l . 40 
2 4 . opockman v . P l u m s t e a g D i s t r i c t Board of WorksU885) 
10 App. C a s . 229 
2 5 . omi rn v . i^. ^1878) 3 App. Cas . 614 
2 b . n o p k i n s v . Smethwick L o c a l Board of H e a l t h ( 1 8 9 0 ) 24 
^ . o .x^. 712 
2 7 . E r r i n g t o n v . i - i i n i s t e r of , - ieal r rn . l935) 1 K . 3 . 2 4 9 
2 8 . . i a r v e y v . S h e l t o n v * 8 8 4 ) lU Lc<5 91 
2 9 . A.V. .musse l U o o ^ ; 10 -30.8 91 
jU.—-^. vTT7TTn7^r;^ity or__^J torTdce •1 ;2J ) 3 t r . 3 5 7 
- ' i . xa..iesaw.^r v . ^UQeiTTlT-^oT"ATC. 4 / 0 
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The word 'just* signifies uprightness* fairness 
or propriety the expression 'natural justice* would 
thus mean the innate of being fair. Fairness cannot 
be in the abstract. The quality of fairness should 
be realised and giust appear to be as such. Natxiral 
justice, therefore, stands for that fundamental equality 
of fairness in which justice is not only done but also 
manifestly seem to be done. In Mohinder Singh Gill's 
case Justice Krishna Iyer observed : 
"It is (natural justice) a flexible, 
pragmatic and relative concept, not a 
rigid, ritualistic or sophisticated 
abstraction. It is not a :. bull in 
China shop or a bee in one's bonnet" 
xlagany, J, in John v. Rees defines 
the phrase natural justice as a justice 
that is simple or elementary, as dis-
tinct from justice that is complex, 
sophisticated and technical". 
According to this observation Justice is of two 
kinds il) that which is simple or elementary, and 
(11) that which is complex, sophisticated and technical. 
It may be pointed out that the first one is equated 
with natural justice while the other can be achieved 
by logical reasoning and philosophical thinking. 
Perhaps Megarry J,, wishes to equate second kind of 
32. Mohinder Singn Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, 
1^78 I.S.C.C. 405, 434 
33. U96S) 2 All. ii.ii. 274 
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of j u s t i c e with tne J u s t i c e whicn i s a b s t r a c t rjatural 
j u s t i c e c o n s i s t s ox c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e s which are essen-
t i a l s of j u s t i c e . I r these e s s e n t i a l p r i n c i p l e s are 
overlookea the r e s u l t WOUXG t r aves ty ox j u s t i c e . 
Thus n a t u r a l j u s t i c e i s the means to the end of j u s t i c e . 
J u s t i c e snould be so aorninistered t h a t the praying 
p a r t y i s convincea t h a t j u s t i c e i s being done to him 
because i t has appeared to him to have been done, the 
dec is ion going aga ins t him notwithstanding. 
x^iatural J u s t i c e wnen invoiced; 
Unt i l very recen t ly the r u l e s of na-cural j u s t i c e 
appl ied only in cases of ac-cs regarded as j u d i c i a l or 
q u a s i - j u d i c i a l . « d i s t i n c t i o n was made whereby the 
r u l e s did not apply in execut ive or adminis t ra t ive a c t s . 
The cou r t s exercised j u d i c i a l con t ro l through wr i t s of 
manaamus and cer- t iorary over those ac t s ox publ ic 
a u t h o r i t y which i t purported to perform in a j u d i c i a l 
manner, on the otherhand admin i s t ra t ive a c t s were 
regaraed as inunune from such c o n t r o l by the cou r t s . In 
o tner woras in deciaing whether na tu ra l j u s t i c e applied 
in any p a r t i c u l a r case or not defendea upon wnecher 
the ac t m quest ion was in i t s nature j u d i c i a l or 
adminis-crative. 
22 
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D.M, Gordan made a distinction between tiie 
judicial or quasi judicial and non judicial functions/ 
i.e. executive or aominlstrative. He said tnat where 
as the judicial function involved the decision of 
rignts and liabilities, the non judicial function 
might be tne performance ot ministerial duties or the 
exercise of aoiuinistrative powers actively to effec-
tuate a policy or expediency with an unfettered dis-
cretion, 
35 
Yardley, however, did not agree with the 
distinction made by Gordon between the administrative 
and ministerial powers. Ke held that tne ministerial 
auty consists in carrying out an administrative decision 
raken already by higher authority. But, on the whole, 
such a power could not be termed as judicial. 
36 
In Malak Singh's case it was contended that 
nature and character of the function involved in the 
making of an entry in tne surveillance register and res-
train anyone including the person registered, access to 
it, is so utterly administrative and non judicial, that 
it is difficult to conceive or tne application of the 
rule audi alteram partem, 
34. "r^dministrative Tribunals and Courts(1933) "49 L.>u.R. 
cia. 419 
35. Yadley, D.CM., A Source Book of English'"' 
administrative Law Und Ed.1970),88 
36. iMalak Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 19S1, S.C. 760 
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Duty to Uphold Individual Liberty; 
wineteentn century and the first half of the 
present century saw man's struggle against political 
37 
oppression and abuse of power by gaining freedom. 
Indeed inaiviauai liberty was regarded so sacrosant 
that State's powers were limited only to those of pro-
tecting the country against external aggression and 
maintenance or internal peace so that citizens could 
freely enjoy the fruits of liberty with the minimum 
possible constraints on their freeaora with the birth of 
tne concept of welfare state the emphasis has now 
shifted from political freedom to economic freedom and 
this shifting of emphasis has also altered the approach 
of the state towards the question of individual liberty. 
In tne name of welfare and equality twentieth century 
liberal has come to favour a revival of the very poli-
cies of state intervention and paternalism against 
38 
wnicn classical liberalism tougnt. 
In view of tnis increased power of the modern 
state it has become all the more necessary to strictly 
39 
adhere to the concept of Rule of Lav, Rule of law 
37, Jeb.R. "Reform of Social Legislation/ Social 
L-efence, >»pril/1977, p, 17 A'o, 23 
38, Gayendragaokar: Law Liberty and Social Justice 
Chapter III, ?. 74 
39, Deb R. 'Police and Law Inforcenent', Chaoter 6, P. 5. 
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recognizes the dignity of man and endows him with an 
irreducible tninimura of fundamental rights as in our 
own constitution, which a civilized state not only 
cannot take away or abridge but has a clear duty to 
promote, foster and protect. The very first rule of 
the police code of conduct too lays down: 
"The police must bear faithful allegience 
to tne constitution or India and res^ e^ct 
and upholJ tne rights or tne citizens as 
guaranteed by it. " '^^ 
Nenru saia, "JNOW in protecting tne rights of 
an individual, no law permits tnat indiviaual to func-
tion in a preuatory manner against his neighbour or 
against society tnat is, the law is supposea to curb 
the predatory instincts of the individual Some line 
has to be drawn somewhere, and tne line may be vary, 
Otnerwise, tne inaividual would become a menance to 
41 
society. 
Individual liberty is no longer an end in itself 
as Lord Acton ana John Stuart Mill once conceived it 
to be. It nas got to be regulated in a larger interest 
of society, for tne aemocracy can no longer be passive 
40, iMullick,3.N. 'A Philosophy for tne Police Chapter 
on Police Code of conduct, quoted by R, i^ eb in 
Police and Law enforcement, 
41. Speech of i-riine Minister -^ t, I^ 'ehru at the Inter-
natj-onal Congress ox jurists, xiew Delhi 1959, as 
reported in 'Rule or Law in Free Society", Inter-
naticial COiTaiiission or Jurists,Ceneva, 0. 41 
25 
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witness to socio-economic struggles and tensions 
when an individual citizen claims freedom oe ought to 
recognize the indiviaual freedoms of his fellow 
citizens and sucn rreedoms of all citizens would 
invariably impose some restrictions on the individual 
43 
liberty and freedom of each one of them. 
Police ; 
Every civilizea society must be policed to 
ensure compliance witn tne law and harmonize the citi-
zen's rignt witn his obligations. This is a minimum 
condition for ordered progress and civic tranquility 
irrespective of the type of the State whether democratic 
or authoritarian or whether wei:£are oriented or security 
orientea. The standard of police is paramount impor-
tance ana should be maintained at as high a level as 
possible, for the peace ana happiness of the country 
depena to a very large extent on the type of police it 
44 
has ana on now tney do tne work. 
i'he policeman symbolise authority and also they 
are the Custodians of the interests of the..society as 
well as individual citizens as far as their basic rights 
42. Gajendragadkar, P,3,, 'Law Liberty And Social 
-r . „ Justice, ir. 63 
43. Ibid. / ?. 7 2 
44 
* i<eauy, Ramchandran K. '.-vOle of Police in a welfare 
State', I.C.J. Vol. 6 i^'o. 1 Jan. 1978. 
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are concerned. It is normally believed among 
civilians that the first line of defence agair.st 
a criminal is the police. Society is critical of 
4b 
the pniXosophy and methods of the police and yet it 
has a great confiaence in tne police since it acmi-
47 
nisters law and keeps oraer in public places. 
Black's Law Dictionary aefines police'a oranch 
of government which is charged with the preservation of 
public oraer/ and tranquility* the promotion of the 
oublic nealth safety, and morals ana the prevention, 
48 
detention and punishment of crimes.' In Encyclopeadia 
of crime and justice, "Police generally refers to 
persons employed by Government wno are authorised to 
use physical force in order to maintain public order 
49 
ana safety. 
Role of Pol ice in Socie ty : 
The broaa o u t - l i n e s of workings of po l ice i s 
s imi la r every-where and in every socie ty . However 
eacn socie ty has i t s own s o c i a l , geographical p o l i -
t i c a l ana economic condi t ions wnich ef fec t rhe working 
of po l i ce . The s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l s e t up of the country 
w i l l be incomplete in tne absence of a careful 
45. Skolnick/«I.H., ' J u s t i c e without Tr ia l , Law Enforce-
ment in i^e.riOcratic Society,p. o 
46. Barnes and Tee te rs , i^ iew dorizones in Criiamology'p. i 
47. B e l l , J . 'Crime in our Time' ,p . 128 
46. Black, ii.C. aiack* s Law Dic t ionary ,p . 1041 
49. Encyclopeadia oz ^^^'^^ ^'^'^ J u s t i c e , vol . 3,p. 1120 
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understanaing o± tne prevelent arrangements of police, 
Xne i^ ational Police Commission while discussing 
tne role of police ana its responsibilities/observea: 
"Tne police responsibility should be tor abso-
lutely impartial service to law complete indepenaencs 
of policy. We hola tnis as the raost fundamental concepi:: 
for oDservance in tne police system in a democracy. 
The basic role of police is to runction as law enforce-
meaz. agency ana render impartial service to law, inci-
cations or desires, oppressed by government as a matter 
of policy which either come in conflict or do not confirm 
to t.".e provisions in oxir constitution or laws duly 
^ ^ ^ '50 
enacted tnere unaerj 
Police Benaviour towards public: 
^ne Utter Praaesn Poxice Co/.imission examined 
police behaviour -cowaras public xa aetail. Ihe Commissio. 
adversely commented on tne lac.< oz politeness ana 
courtesy towaras public* 
Ihe attitude of-hostility - created against the polic; 
can not ce attributed entirely -co tne nature of duties 
perrormed by it* for in tne ulti-Tiate analysis it is 
tne way tne police function while counts in making iz 
50. j.Nia-cionai Police Coau.iission, Second Report ririA, Govt. 
of India a579) , P. 12 
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popular or unpopular in the public. The rough and 
over bearing behaviour of a police man in his dealing 
with the public and victiins of crime and an unsympathetic 
attitude adopted by the staff of the police station in 
recording the first information Report are. Some of the 
factors contributing to the unpopularity of the police, 
i^o-c only criminals but also decent citizens too are often 
treated in a manner which is obviously irritating. The 
police must be able to assure that criminals would be 
meted out with just punishment* but the requirements of 
law abiding citizens would receive prompt and courteous 
attention. Politeness and courtesy are virtues which 
must be developed in the police force. People who have 
suffered at the hands of criminal deserve tendencies* 
which would create a lasting bond between the sufferer 
and the police, that will not easily give way even if the 
police, despite its best efforts fail to work out a case, 
iiegligence/ indifference and half hearted approach on 
the part of the police created feeling of frustration and 
disappointed and make the people suspect that the policemer. 
are hand in.,glove with criminals. .Ve have no doubt in 
our mind that if the police takes strong attitudes towards 
turbulenc and anti-social elements and deals with them 
with firmness it will win approbation of the public insteac 
29 
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of incurring its displeasure. 
Once a judge of ^illahabad riigh Court, Justice 
Anand Narain Mulla passed severe strictures on the 
police force of the country as a whole when he lebelled 
them as "biggest single lawless group" in the country. 
Hximan Rights: 
"Human rights are some times called fundamental 
rignts or basic rights or natural rights. As fundamental 
basic, rights they are tnose which must not be taken 
away hY any legislature or any act of governmenL. and 
which are often set out in a constitution, As natural 
rights they are seen as belonging to men and women by 
their very nature. Another way to describe them would 
be to call tnem 'common rights*/ for they are rights 
whicn all men or women in the world should snare. Just 
as the common law in England, for example, was the body 
of ruu.es and customs wnich, unlike local cus'coms, go-
52 
verned tne whole country". Human rights are not 
created by any legislation, they assvune the position 
of natural rights. Any civilized country or body like 
tne U,i.\.. must recognise them, i-ierabers of the U.N, have 
51. U.P. Police Commission, 70 (1960-61) 
52. i'avicetc, J.Z.o., The Law of i-iations, P. 151 
30 
committed themselves to promote respect for 
53 
and observance of human rights and fundamental freedom 
Before the adoption of the Cnarter or the U.i.i. the 
international community could not determine the extent 
to wnich the citizens of an individual state were to 
enjoy the civil rights according to its own consti-
tution precepts. 
riuman Righrs i 
The universal ^jeclaration of Human Rights 1948 
contain a preamble and 30 (thirty) articles. It lays 
down the basic hviman rights and fundamental freedoms 
to which all men and woman everywhere are entitled 
without any distinction as to race, sex, colour/ language 
religion, political or other opinions. It states the 
common standard of acnievement for all people as an 
expression of legal conscience of mankind. It con-
tained many characteristics and lofty ideals of demo-
cratic constitutions like the one found in American 
54 
Conscitution, 
The ooramission on human rights was duly consti-
tued in 19-*6 and instructed to prepare among other 
tnings, a draft interna-cional bill of rignts, bnx. before 
53. Lauter^achc, International Law and riuman RighT:s,p. 15; 
54. Khare J.C : riuman Rights ^^  U.i^ .,P. 13 
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it couxd hold its first regular session/ the panaxna-
nian delegation to the first session of the General 
Assembly later that year tried again to have its 
draft adopted. The Assembly taking noce of these 
plans referred the Panamanian draft to the Com;r.ission 
5:3 
on Human Righ-cs for consideration. And the lasc 
explicit reference to numan rignts in the charter is 
in article 76/ where one of the basic objectives of 
tne trusteeship system is declared to be * to encourage 
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, 
or religion and to encourage recognition of the inter-
dependence of the people of the world. 
The articles of the declaration laying down 
positive rights of the individuals. These rights can 
be devided into three categories: 
(1) Those dealing with personal freeddas contained 
in Art. 1 to 20. 
(2) Dealing with poli-cicai rights - relating to 
form government of their choice Article 21. 
(3) Dealing witn social righrs contained in 
.^ticle 22 to 28. 
55. ^ured/ Z. • The Inrernational protection of Human 
Rights', P. 46 
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The rights and freedoms mentioned in the first 
category are the following; 
1, All human beings are born free and equal on 
dignity and rights. 
2, iiinjoyment of rights and freedom without distinction. 
3, Right to life* liberty and security of persons. 
4, Freedom from slavery and servitudeiij 
5r Prohibition against torture/ inhximan treatment 
or punishment, 
6. Recognition as a person before the law, 
7. Equal protection of the law, 
8. Freedom from arbitrary arrest detention or exile. 
9. Effective remedy before the National Tribunals, 
10. Rignt to fair hearing by an independent and 
impar-cial tribunal, 
11. Presuraption of innocence and right to public 
trial witl^  all guarantees necessary for defence 
in criminal cases. 
12. Freedom from ex-post facto laws, 
13. Freeaom from interference with privacy. 
The declaration is neither a treaty'hor an inter-
national agreeraenr as such ir was a statement of principles 
of inalienable numan rights/ setting up a co.TJUon standard 
of achievement for all peoples and all nations. However/ 
Prof. Lauterpacht is of the view that being a facile 
33 
generalization of the U.i'i. Charter lays down legal 
obliga-cions of the members to act in accordance -with 
these purposes. The impact of the declaration has been 
much and more lasting than any political document or 
legal instrument with in and outside U.i^ , 
rhe Suropean Convention-on Human Rights; 
while progress in the field of human rigars 
with-in the United Nations is almost at a stands till, 
a significant advance in the same sphere has been made 
in >Vestern Europe. This advance is apparent in -che 
scheme establish by the European Convenuion for the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms/ 
which may be seen as an expression of the European idea. 
In the interest of human values and human liberty, 
the Assembly was to make proposals for the establishment 
of a court of justice with adequate sanctions for the 
implementation of the Charter and to this end any citizer. 
of the associated countries \ia-s to have redress before 
tne court; at any time and with the least possible delay, 
for any violation of his rights as formula-ced in the 
Charter. 
The convention that 'began at the beginning with 
the basic civil and political rights* thougn others 
were to be added later. But as a result, a large number 
34 
of individual applications to the commission on hxiraan 
rights have had to be throughout because the applicant 
alleged the violation of a right whicn - however 
necessary or desirable. 
Part I of the convention sets out eleven rights 
and freedoms which are specifically guaranteed. These 
are: 
1. The right to life; 
2. Freedom from tortxire and from in human treatment 
or punishment; 
3. Freedom from slavery and servitude; 
4. The right to liberty and security of person, 
5. The right to fair trial; 
6. Protection against retroactivity of the law; 
7. The right to respect for one's private and 
family life, one's home and one's correspondence; 
3. Freedom of thought* conscience and religion; 
9. Freedom of expression; 
10. Freedom of Assembly and association; 
11. The right to marry and found a family. 
In India the apex court have taken recourse of 
these rights where a matter of life, libertv and 
56 ' 57 
privacy arose. For instance in ^^ ovind and .-lalk Singh, 
56. Govind v. M.P., .•^ .I..!. igvS-S.C I37S 
57, Halak Singh v. Stace of ^unjao, ^,1..-^, 1931, S.C. 76C 
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court relied its with reference to Art. 8 of the Exiropean 
convention on Human rlghnsf as -
(1) Every one has the right to respect for his 
private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
(2) There shall be no interference by a public autho-
rity with the exercise of this right except such 
as is in accordance with the law and is necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or tne economic 
well-being of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others. 
"Having reached to this, we are satisfied that 
drastic in coads directly into tne privacy and indirectly 
into the fundamental rights, of a citizen will be made 
if Regulations 855 and 856 were to be read widely. To 
interpret the rule in harmony with the constitution is 
therefore necessary and canalisation of the powers 
vested in the police by the two regulations, if they are 
to be saved at all. Our founding fathers were thoroughly 
opposed to a Bolice Raj even as our history of the 
58 
struggle for freedom has bori^ e eloquent testimony to it." 
58. As per ;-iathew,J., in Govind v. State of M.P., at 
o. 1385 
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Traditionally there has been a constant tussle 
between the individual liberty and the social restraint. 
It is a common phenomenon that individual claims more 
and more liberty free from all restraints whereas 
society wants to restrict it. However neither the 
absolute freedom nor the total control is desirable* 
what is therefore desirable is the restrictive liberty 
i.e. both liberty and social control go together. 
CH/^TER - I I 
POLICS xiEGULATIJNS AI^ D LIBERTIES 
l i ^ 
U . 5 . ^ . AWD ERITAli.Nl 
AI'lERIC-ri: DUE PROCESS M^u POLICE POWER, BILL 
OF RIGHTS, REPORT o F IHE, PRESIDE^vT' 5 
Cei^IMITTEE DUE PROCESS OF Lex.-,, -nRREST 
SE-nRCH AND SEIZURE, EXCLUSION/^Y RULI 
B R I T A I I M : POLICE POWERS, POLICE wUiiSTlJl-ill'iG, 
DETENTION:; FOR ^UESTI^NIi iC,ARREST 
OK SUSPICION £NTRY. 
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AMERICA 
uUE PROCESS Ai^ D THE POLICE POWER: 
The happiness of a State consists in a "Just 
poize" between authority and Liberty. To describe the 
interplay between authority and Liberty in these terms 
requires acute perception , It recognizes tnat both 
are essential elements in the functioning of any polity 
and that their coexistence must some how be reconciled . 
But there are all too few who frankly acknow-
ledge that rtU-chority and Liberty are complementary, not 
competing/ elements in a political society. Most often 
the problem is stated, not in terms of necessary re-
conciliation, but in terms of mutual exclusion. Even 
so discerning an observer as John Stuart Mill begins 
his essay,On liberty by referring to the "struggle bet-
ween Liberty and Authority" as the most conspicuous 
feature in history. 
The notion that the people have no need to limit 
their power over themselves is one which we nave rejected 
in our very concept of constitutionalism. What is true, 
is triat, in a representative system dominated by a 
Constitution, the just claims of both Authority and 
Liberty must be recognized, 
1. Schwartz, Bernard, ^ Commentary on the Constitution 
of the United States, p. 1 and 2 
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The basic problem confronting the constitu-
tion maker is precisely that of securing a "just 
poize" oetween Authority and Liberty. The Constitu-
tion, we saw, clothes the polity it creates with all 
tne powers suitable to a great nation. If we look, 
at the fundamental document as we have un-cil now been 
aoing - as a caarter of government power- we must 
conclude that it does endow tiie Federal Government 
with all tne vital substantive autnority needed to 
permit it to fulfill the beneficent purposes of the 
Fraraers "In the body of our Constitution" Chief Justice 
Warren has well said, "the rounding Fathers insured 
tnat the Governmeni: would have the power necessary 
2 
to govern". 
Bill of Rights: 
The American people have i:}een blessed with a 
Bill of Rights at least since 1791, when the ratifi-
cation of the first ten amendments to the constitution 
was complered. There is reason to say "ar least" 
since then, for wnen a great outcry went up that the 
Constitution framea in 1787 contained no Bill of Rights, 
tne reply was made that the entire documeat: was a 
2. kv'arren, "Tne uill of Rights and the Militaxy" 
37, .•iew York University Law Review, 181 (1962; 
Charter or rights and liberties. Both in tne cnaracter 
of the original Constitution and in its specific 
details that was true to a much greater extent tnan 
alarmed citizens realized. Yet a Charter of freedom 
it was woefully deficient. By over sight and under-
estimate, great gaps were left in the protective armour 
against governmental oppression and the tyrany of 
popular majorities. Responding to a na-cion wice demand, 
tne first: Congress of the Unitea Stares undertook to 
supply wnat was missing. It seemed to nave done so 
witn the submission to tne States, in 1789, of twelve 
amendments, all of wnich were pro.aptly ratified except 
two of trivial importance relating to tne-compos^tion 
and pay of congress. 
Tne name "Bill of Rignts" was at once applied 
to tnese ten amendments, but m a truely national 
sense it was a misnomer. The restraints contained in 
tnem were imposed solely upon tne xsceral government, 
ine States \/ere untoucned DV tnese pronibitory mandates. 
Seventy years passed, tne Civil war carr.e, devidin 
tne nation oy its on set and comenting it by force in 
its outcome, rts one result of tne struggle, tnree 
million Americans of ^frican aescent were propelled 
from slavery inco tne rank of freemen. Ihey oecaine 
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witn 
citizens/unestablished ri-^ hts of citizenship- living 
and destined to live for generations under the poli-
tical sway of their former masters. A new national 
responsibility had to be assumed/ and one .aspect of it 
was the expansion of the existing Bill of Rights to 
make its provisions effective against violation by the 
States as well as by the national government. The 
result was the addition, in 1865, 1868 and 1870 of the 
"Civil War Amendments" - the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth - primarily designed to protect the freedmen 
and their descendants, but aimed also at a broader 
3 
guarantee of liberty and equality for all of the people. 
The right to security of the person from phy-
sical injury or intimidation is a fundamental right of 
the residents of any civilized community. In the 
United States infringement of this right nas principally 
involved the Negro population, but other racial reli-
gious, national and political minorities have from time 
to time suffered from violence or tnreats of violence. 
In 1947 president Truman's Committee on eivil Rights made 
an historic survey of the freedom. Extracts from its 
Keport follow. 
3. Brant, Irving, The Bill of Rights, p. 3,4 
4. The Presxaent's Committee on civil rights was appQinte, 
oy president Trvunan on jjec. 5, 1946, to study and make 
recommendations for strengtneniag and improving"the 
civil rights of the people". The Conimittee was compose: 
of 15 distinguished citisens, heade by -ir. Charles E. 
.-iison, Presic^ent of the -eneral -leetrie company. 
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TQ SECURE THESE RIGHTS - THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S 
CQ.-u'IITT££ Oi-vj CIVIL RIGHTS: 
nasningtoni U.S. Government Printing Office,1947,pages 
6,20,30 
Freeaom can exist only where the citizen is 
assured that his person is secure against bandage, 
lawless violence, and arbitrary arrest and punishment. 
Freedom from slavery in ail its forms is clearly neces-
sary if all men are to have eqnaal opportunity to use 
tneir talents and to lead worm while lives, i^ iorsover, 
to be free, men must be subject to discipline by 
society only for commission of offences clearly defined 
by law and only after triax by due process of law, 
where the aominis-cxa-cion or justice is discriminatory, 
no man can be sure of security where the threat of 
violence by private persons of moDs exists, a cruel 
inhibition of tne sense of freedom of activity ana 
security of the person inevitably results. Where a 
society permits private ana arbitrary violence to be 
«f ter a com^jrehensive survey extending over a year 
the COiPJTiittee issuea its findings and recommenda-
tions in a report. The following extract from the 
report embodies the Committee's findings with 
respect to the status of the right to seciirity of 
the person at the end of 1947. The Committee's 
appraisal may be taken as on authortative ,if 
perhaps moderate, statement of the problem. 
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done to its members, its own integrity is inevitably 
corrupted. It can not permit human beings to be 
5 imprisoned or killed in tne absence of due process. 
Due Process of Law; 
*vhat 'due process ot law" exactly means/ is 
difficult to define even at the present day. The 
Constitution contains no description ot wnat is 'due 
process or law', nor does it declare the principles 
by application of which it could be ascer-cainea. In 
6 
•Turning v, i.'^ew Jersey court observed: 
"Few pnrases in tne law are so 
elusive of exact apprehension as 
tnis* This courr nas always dec-
lined to give a comprehensive defi-
nition of ix. and has preferred that 
its full meaning should be gradually 
ascertaxneo by the process of incla.sioi 
ana excxusion m tne course of tne 
aecisions of cases as they arise". 
It IS cleor however that the requirement of 
'aue process of law' in tne United States Constitution 
implies a iiinitation u^ o^n ail the ^owers of Government, 
legislative as wejl as executive ana judicial. In 
runerica it became a bulwork against arbitrary legis-
lation. It is restraint upon the legislative power. 
D, j-merson, oc .-laroerj - Political ana Civil Ai,jjncs 
in Unitea States, vol. 1^) , p. 1-2 
o. a908) 211 U.S. 78 
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The object is to protect citizens against arbitrary 
and capricious legislation. Hence it is not within 
the competence of the Congress to make any process a 
'cue process of law* by its mere will; for that would 
make the limitation quite nugatory. 
The mcianing of the expression 'due process of 
law' has not a definite cannotation. It expresses a 
very elastic conception. The best description of the 
expression would be, in each particular case such an 
exercise or the powers of Government as the settled 
maxims of law permit and sanction. Under such safeguards 
for tne protection of individual rights as those maxims 
prescribe for tne cls^s of .c.ases to which the one in 
question belongs. 
prof- Wills in his Gonstitutional Law of the 
United States ^1936) pointed that the modern essentials 
of due process are: 
^1) wotice; 
v2j Opportunity to be heard; 
^3) an impartial tribunal; and 
(4) an orderly course of procedure. 
Ihus/ it could be summed up as the process which 
is due under Jus naturale: principles of natural justice. 
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The two corner stones ares 
U) Audi alteram partem 
(Hear,the otherside) 
i2) i^ emo Judex non-causa sua 
(i^lo person can be botn a judge and a 
7 
prosecutor). 
Until about 1850/ the Due Process clause was 
interpreted as protecting against unfair procedures 
onxy and not against tne substance of legislation. In 
otherwords, it was construed as being merely a proce-
dural rather tnan a substantive restriction upon 
governmental action. 
It guaranteed certain protective rights to an 
accused person before he could be deprived of his life, 
liberty or property. These rights included: 
(1) ptotection against arrest without warrant; 
Cii) the right to counsel; 
i^ iii) the requirement of indictment: by a grant jury 
before trial; 
(.iv) the right of the accused to hear the nature of 
tne eviaence against him; 
(vX the right to an impartial jury of tne accused 
person's peers, ana 
vvij the requirement of a verdict before any 
sentence was executed. 
7, Justice 3. ..iohaii, "The Swing of the Pendulum''From 
Proceaure to Jue Process C1987) i-iadras Law Journa-,vol. 
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Mfter 1953, the Warren Court launched in to 
an era of j u d i c i a l act ivism/ breatning l i f e in to the 
concept of soDstantive due process and using i t with 
renewed v a d i l i t y . 
In tne 1960's, the 'warren Court's developed 
two new c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s as off shoots of subs-
tan t ive due p roces s : tne r i g h t of privacy and r i g h t to 
t r a v e l . 
8 
In -Griswold v. Connecticut, the court with 
oustice ijogias speaking for the raajority, invaliaared 
a Connecticut state statute prohibiting the use of con-
traceptives and the aispensing of birth control infor-
ma-cion to married couples as being an invasion of a 
Constitutional right of marital privacy. .-^ Ithougn this 
right of privacy was not one of the guarantees specified' 
in tne Bill of Rights, the court iaentified it as being 
one of the 'Penumoral' rignts emanating from the guaran-
tees of the First rtxnendment ^Privacy of association) , 
the rhira ^rnenoment ;^rivacy of home) , the Fourth nmend-
ment ^Privacy of property and ^ e^rsons) , -che Fif-ch 
nmendraent (^ privilege against self-incrimination) and 
iVinth amendment ^rights specifically enumerated not 
to be considered as denying otxier rights not enumerated) . 
6, a965) 3S1 U.S. 479 
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The Court extended the right of privacy even 
9 
to cover abortion cases. In Roe v. vVade Balckura w^ote 
the opinion _ 
"The right to wrivacy, grounded in the 
Fourteenth Amendment's rule process guarantee of 
personal liberty encompasses and protects a Woman's 
decision wnetner or not to bear a child. This right 
is impermissibly abridgea by state laws whicn make 
abortion a crime, except wnen performed to save the 
life of xsie. momer. 
Law of Arrest and Search; 
xne jfourtn Amenoiaent protects inaiviauals 
and "their houses, papers and effect" only from 
unreasonable searcnes and seizures. The -^ ourtn amend-
ment does not require arrest warrants. The Constitu-
tional standard for legal arrest is the sa;ae as that 
for obtaining an arrest: warranti probable cause. 
prooable cause is more than mere suspicion, rumor, or 
even strouL, suspicion, "probaole cause exists* if the 
facts and circxiiiistonces known to the officer warrant 
a prudent man izi believing that the offence has been 
coiTunittea" and that the indiviaual arrested has 
committed the offence. on tne otner hand, while 
9. aS73) 410, U.o. 113 
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probable cause is more than mere suspicion, it 
does not require evidence sufficient to establish 
10 
guilt beyond a reasonable do\ibu. 
11 
In Terry v. Ohio, the arresting officer 
observing Terry and two coaipanions repeatedly walking 
back and forth and lookiny into a store window in the 
middle of the afternoon, stopped the men, identified 
himself as a police officer and asxed for their names. 
When they failed to respond, he "patred them elown" to 
de-cermine if they were carrying any weapons, cut he 
did not search them beneath tneir ourer garments, Terry 
and one companion were carrying guns and were formally 
charged with that offence. Opinion of the Court was 
delijwered by Justice Warren tnus: 
"We merely hela, where a police officer 
observes unusual conduct which leads him 
reasonably to conclude in lignt: of his 
experience that criminal activity may be 
a foot and thar tiie persons with wnom he 
is dealing may be armed and presently 
dangerous; wnere in tne course of inves-
tigation this behaviour himself as a 
police man and makes reasonable inquires... 
such a search is a reasonable searcn under 
the Fourth Amendment". 
10. t-Jrossman and .veils, Consri-cutional Law u Judicial 
Policy i-iaking, p. 787 
11. U968) 392 U.S. 1 
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On tne otherhand dissenting Mr, Justice 
uouglas held; 
"I agree that petitioner was 'seized* within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. I also agree 
that frisking petitioner and his companions for guns 
was a 'search'. But it is mystery how tnar 'searcrj' 
and tiiat 'seizure' can be constitutional oy Fourth 
^nendrnenc stanaards. Unless there .vas probable cause 
to believe that, 
1^} a crime nas been committed, or 
\2) a crime was in process of being committed 
(3j a crime was about to be committed. 
There would be a "prooable cause" sao\in. But 
the crirae here is earring concealed weapons; and there 
is no basis for concluding that: officer has probable 
cause for believing that crime was being committed. 
'We hola toaay that the police have greater au-chority 
to make a "seizure" and conduct a "search" than a 
juage hc^s to au-chorise such action. 
12 
In United States v. Robinson, I-ir. Justice 
Rennquis-c delivered the opinion of the court zsixxsi 
12. U973; 414 U.S. 218 
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"It is well settled that a search 
incident to a iawtui arrest is a 
traditional exception to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 
This general exception has historically 
oeen formulated in to two distinct pro-
positions. The first is that a search may 
be made of a person of tne arrestee by 
virtue of the lawful arrest. The second 
is that a search may be made of the area 
witnin the control of the arrestee 
A custodial of a suspect basea on probable 
cause is a reasonable intrusion under the 
rourtn rtmendraent; that intrusion being 
lawful, a searcn incident to the arrest 
requii-e no additional justificarion". 
The j^xciusionary Rule; 
13 
In Weeks v. United States the Supreme Court held 
that evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
coulu not be used in criminal trials in the federal 
courts. The decision departed from the traditional Anglo-
American doctrine that rhe admissibility of evidence 
was to be determined by its probity and reliability and 
not by how it was obtained. «.s expressed by Justice 
Cardozo "Is tne criminal to go free because tiie Constable 
14 lb 
has blundered?" In >;olf v. Colorado the Court consi-
dered wnether to apply tne Fourth irunenoment to tae 
States. Colorado Officers/ without a warrant searched 
tne office of i>r. Wolf. On the basis of the medical 
recoras that tney seized. Or. .v'o-if was convicted of per-
xorming illegal abortions. The Supreme Court he_d 
1 3 . \l-^l^j 2 4 5 , U . ^ , o l 3 
1 4 . P e o p l e V. i ^ e f o r e i>1926) 270 , u . S . 657 
1 5 . <19'*y; 338 U . S . 25 
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that the search violated the Fourth ana Fourteenth 
rtmend'ueiits/ the first uime the Fourth Amendment had 
been applied to States- However, the Court also 
held that the eviaence seized need not be excluded 
from Dr. .volf's trial in a otate Court. 
16 
In Mapp v. Ohio the Court changed its policy 
and held tnat eviaence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments was not admissible in 
state criminal trials/ noting tnat other potential 
sanctions against illegal police conduct had not v;orked; 
internal police departnent disciplinary procedures 
were ineffective; civil suits for damages rarely produced 
enforceable judgments. The Court , tnerefore took m e 
"final" step and in Mapp closed "the only court room 
aoor remaining open to evidence secured by official 
lawlessness — " Justice Clark cited the need to 
deter unlawful police behaviour and the preservation of 
judicial integrity as tne main reasons for tnis reversal 
of policy. 
BRITAIi.-J; 
In England the image of a policeman, unlike other 
countxies is or a big brother or an elder brox±ier. 
Inspite of this people feel that their liberties are 
16. ^1961) 367 U.5, 643 
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affected tnrough police processes. There we find 
i'iagna Carta as an old authenticated document on liber-
ties. In the 39th Chapter of :iagna Carta, it is stated: 
"i>io freeman shall be taken or 
ijnprisoned or disseized or out-
lawed or exiled or in any way 
distroyed; nor snail we go upon 
him nor send upon him buu. by the 
lawful judgment of his peers and 
by tne law of the land". 
In Unglana ana ua.les, maintenance of law and 
order is tne exclusive responsibility of tne police. 
The police, for this purpose, nave always enjoyed ade-
quate powers unaer the common law and various enactments 
sucn as tne public Meeting /^ cz, 1936 >, 1 Edw.8 and Geo 5C6 
Police rtct, 1964, and the Race Re-arions roct, 1976, In 
aadition , tne recently enacted Fuclic Order «,ct, 1986, 
coaifies tne common law offences of riot, unlawful 
assemoly ana affray; ennances •cae powers of the police 
to conrrol public processions and assemblies in cerrain 
circumstances; strengtnens the law against incitement 
to racial hatred. The Act also gives tne police a new 
power to direct trespassers to leave in certain circum-
stauces. The power is specificaj.ly aimed at tne mischief 
caused bv riie mass occupation of land by itinerant 
17 
groups against the owner's wisnes. 
17. l-Jadeem,.^ iZhar iiussaini, Z'he ?unjao Police in a 
Com^eracive ^Perspective, p. 136 
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Under the eriminal L.aw ^ ct 1967- A constable may-
arrest without warrant any person who is or whom he, 
with reasonable cause, suspects to be, about to 
commit on arrestable offence or where a constable, 
with reasonable cause, suspects that an arrestable 
ofrence nas been committed, he may arrest withtout 
warrant any one wnom he, with reasonable cause, suspect 
to be guilty of the offence, 
-^^ part from it under the firearms ^^t 1968,- A 
Constaole may require any person wnom he has reasonable 
cause to suspect -
(a) of having a fire-arm, witn or without ammunition, 
\vith him in a public place, or 
.^b) to be cominit-cing or about to commit, elsewhere 
than in a public place, an offence relevant for 
13 
the purposes of this section. 
d.H, Bailey writes about the Police powers con-
tained in several r«;ts. He is of the view that the 
present law satisfies noboay. It is far too complex, 
contained in a miscellany of, after archaie, statutes 
and cases. Problems whicn are difficult enougn as exa-
mination questions are trickier still for tne 'Policeman 
on tne beat' who will often have to act without pro-
longed deiiberat-on. If the rules are known their prscijt:^  
13. x-ixggins, Paul u. ^ases ot nateri-ais on ^ivii ^xberwies 
^«^es 225,2So,257 
meaning may be uncertain. And when there meaning 
is Cxear their content is often unsatisfactory. Many 
powers of the police are of unduly wide scope and yet, 
at the sa.ue time, the police do not possess certain 
powers wnicn many would regard as necessary to the 
19 
performance of tneir tasks. 
POLICE OU£STIQi-iIi.\i^ G: 
asking questions is central to tne task of detec-
ting ana investigating crime, wuesrions need to be 
put X.Q a variery of persons (e.g. suspects, witnesses) 
at various stages of investigation i, e.g. vher. there 
is general suspicion tnat an orfence may nave ceen. 
committed; when suSj-.icion begins to point to a parti-
cular individual; when tne police believe an individual 
to have committed an ofxence and seek an acxraission of 
20 
guilt) , 
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In ixice v. Connolly, Police Officers pecrolling 
lare at mignt in an area wnere a number of breaking 
ofa.ences nac just: been committed observed ^^ ice loiterin: 
aoout the streets. The Officer asked him wnere he was 
going to, where he had come from and for his name and 
19. Bailey, Harris,oc Jones, "Civil Liberties-Cases and 
iMateriais/ Pi 35 
20. Ibid, 
21. K1966) 2 «11 E.R. 649 
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address kice gave only his surname and the name of 
the street on whicn ne saia to he lived. The officers 
asked Kice to accompany them to a nearby polics-box 
so that this inforruation could be cnecked. Rice refused 
to move unless arrested. The Officers obliged. Rice 
appealed against conviction under section 51i^ 3) of the 
Police rtct, 1964, Lord Parker C.J. observed: 
'. rtccoraingly, the sole question 
here is whether the defendant had a 
lawful excuse for refusing to answer 
the questions put to him. In my judgment/ 
he had. It seems to me quite clear that 
tnough every citizen has a moral dury 
or, if you like, a social duty to assist 
the police, there is no legal duty to 
that effect, and indeed the whole basis 
of the common law is the right of the 
individual to refuse to answer questions 
put to him by persons in authority, and 
to refuse to accompany those in aumority, 
to any particular place: Short of Course 
of arrest." 
DETEIxtTIQ^ j- FOR QUESTIONING: 
22 
In Keulin v. Gardiner Two boys were visiting 
nomes of members of their school rug by team to remind 
them of a forthcoming match. Two plain clotned police 
officers became suspicions of the boys' benaviour. One 
approached tne boys and asked them what they were doing. 
He stated that ne was a police man and showed his card 
22. a967) 2 ^o 510 
5 r. 
but tnis information did not register in the minds of 
tne boys. One coy tried to run away but was restrained 
by tne Orficer. The ooy not realising tne restrainer 
was a police officer, struck tne officer and escaped, 
Furtner struggle ensued. The boys were charged under 
section 51ti; Police Act 1964, They appealed against 
conviction. 
if<inn L,J. observed: 
".,, -vas tnis officer entitled in law 
to take nold of tne of the first boy 
by the arm,,.,? I feel my myself com-
pelled to say tnat -cne answer to thar 
question must be in negative whar 
was done was not done as an integral 
step in tne process or arresting, but 
was done in order to secxire an oppor-
tunity/ by aetaming tne boys from escape, 
to put to them or x.o either of them the 
question wnicn was regarded as the tes-c 
question to satisry tne ofricers wnerner 
or nor it would be right in the circu."-
stances/ and having regard to the ansv.er 
obtainea from that question, if any, zo 
arrest tnem. 
I regret to say that I tnink tnere was a 
tecnnical assauxc by tne police officer...," 
In England a policeman is empowered to arrest a 
person to whom he has reasonable suspicion Txx:iX20iac-necaa<s< 
r2asua^ aK'tK sii5>:iiiiJ0iii: that he nas eitner committed an 
offence or is about to corrcmit, under (Criminal law ^ct, 1967. 
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However this discretion should be used Scott L.u. in 
23 
•Oumbell v, Roberts observed: 
" the constable shall before 
arresting satisfy himself that there 
do in fact exist reasonable grounds 
ror suspicion of guilt. The duty 
of tne police.,,,. is/no doubt, to be 
quick to see tne possibility of crime, 
but equally they ought to be anxious 
to avoid mistaking tne innocenc for 
the guilty. " 
24 
In riussien v. Chang fook Kam / Lora Devlin said; 
"To give power to arrest on reasonable 
suspicion aoes not mean tnat it is 
always or even ordinarily to be exer-
cised. It means that there is an exe-
cutive discretion. In exercise of xz. 
many factors have to be considered 
besides tne strength of the case. The 
philosopny of escape, the preventior: 
oi further crime and tne obstxuction oi 
police inquiries are examples or -cnose 
factors'' 
EiSiTRY; 
Ihe usual way in wnicn pol ios ozficars and 
otner _^ujjlic o;:f^cials ob ta in en t ry to pre.Tiises i s by 
invicacion express or implied. without sucn an inv i -
t a t ion , tney mus;: p o i n t to lawful au-choricy zo enter , 
wnicn ;Tiay be conferrred by the cOiiimon law^" by a statu-
tory power to enter witnout warrant, ^e.g. to e f fec t an 
23. a947} 1 « l i . 2R 326 
24 . Ui'VOj .-^.J. 942 
2 5 . Thomas v . p a w k i n s , vl935) 2 Ko 249 
C.7 
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arrest, unaer section 2 of the Criminal Liaw ^ ^t 1967 ) or 
by a warrant autnorising an arrest searcn or entry. 
An unlawful entry may be raet by the use of 
reasonable force/ and may be the-subject of an action 
for damages/ although tne former is likely to be r:Lsky 
vbotn pnysicaliy ana legally; and the latter fraucnt 
witn practical difficulties. 
27 
The famous case of Lady Diana Cooper, in -wnicn 
at midnight on 19 February 1968/ four police officers 
wenc to the nome of Lady Liana Cooper and executed a 
warrant to searcn for drugs. The police nac acted on 
an anonymous telephone call. The matter was raised in 
the House of Commons by i-ir, Norman St, John- Steaves. 
He complained tnat the conduct of the police in acting 
on the call/ and making no attempt to cneck it was an 
'intolerable practice.,,. If this is allowed to go un-
challenged/ then an Englishman's home/ for from be«ng his 
Castle, is reduced to the status or a .ligwam. ' He also 
pointed out that the safeguard of the intervention of 
a magistrate was 'nullified if magistrates do not inform 
themselves fully of the grounds of which the police are 
seeking to act or if, having informed themselves, they 
are not prepared to exercise their discretion about what 
26. Criminal Law Act 1967/ S. 2 (6) 
27. 7c0 r.Z Leb Col. 826 ff 
58 
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constitutes reasonable suspicion'. 
In rtmerica, tne people have achieved liberties 
after a long struggle witn the State, either it is 
'Bill of Rights' or the 'Ameadments', graaually the 
U.3, Supreme Court nas interpreted the liberty clauses 
in favour of persons. Though/ there also, blacks are 
nor entit-iea so mucn social dignity, as in comparision 
to whites, even by tne judiciary. Inspits of all this 
the 'Due process of law' is tne sole weapon in the 
hands of judiciary to kill m e demon of arbitrariness. 
In barren's era juages or the U.S. Supreme 
Court went to the extent of reading and protecting 
those civil liberties wnicn were not even mentioned 
in the U.S. Constitution for.-ially. For instance Uustics 
2 9 
Doglas's Opinion in Griswold, and Justice aalckum' in 
30 Roe' s case, clearly shows that the U.S. Supreme Court 
nas successfaliy demonstrated with judicial wisdom 
in protecting the privacy of marital home which is 
not expressly mentioned in r>merican Constitution, by 
reading it in to Fifth and Fourteenth rvmendments of 
the Constitution. 
2o. Sailey, nai.jLs, ^ wones 'Civil Liberties cases 
ana I-laterials, p. 7 2 
2 9. Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 381, U.S. 479 
J 0. j^ oe V. ..ade 1^973 ), 410, U.S. 113 
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British system haying unwritten constitution, 
still hold good in the field of liberties/ if cbnipared 
to others. As it is human nature, conflict between 
control and liberty always exist. i^-iany statutes 
prevailing in Britain satisfy no one. Balancing approach 
taken by British judges, neither satisfy the citizen's 
nor the police. Police seeks more power to conuTol 
crime, on the otnerhand citizens seek more liberties 
to enj oy. 
CHAPTER - I I I 
RIGHT 'Ivj I.^Lx^SQi'jAL L I B E R T Y Ii.» I I M D I A 
iPxvEr^'iBLZ - FUi\iJ«i'iEI^3TAL R I G H T 3 - FROTZCTIO.i Oi 
L I J T E Ai;jJ j;-iji<.oUiM'rt.Ij L I B E R T Y , I T ' S MEAI^I IMG -
FRCX^EDURE E 3 T A B L I 3 H S D BY LA'W— i-iAi'-iiLKA GALII/nl ; 
11 I I ii II I I I I I I 
6C 
Certain fundamental rights to ensure individual's 
licerty has been insertea in Indian Constitution. opeaKing 
of its importance and reliance, first Prime Minister Pt. 
iVehru said, " The whole conception of cne fundamental 
rights in the protection of individual liberty and freedom. 
That is a basic conception and to know where from it was 
derived you have to go back to European History from the 
latter da^ of the 18th century, roughly speaking you may 
say from the days of the French Revolution which spread 
on to tne 19th century. That might be said to be the domi-
nating idea of the 19th centxiry ana it was continued and 
it is a matter of Fundamental importance, Nevertneless, 
as the 19th centiiry marched in to 20 th century as tne 20 th 
century marched ahead, other additional ideas can-ie into 
the field which are represented by our Directive principles 
1 
of State Policy". 
Preamble; 
The preamDle may be compared to tne dharter of 
liberty as fonr.ulated by the founding-fathers of the 
rtmerican Republic or with the demand of Equality of x^ ights, 
the Charter enunciated by the promoters of the French 
iievolution. The Former gave the slogan - " No representatic. 
i, Pt. Jawanar o^ al i-iehru made tnis observation while moving 
the Constitution ( 1st ame.:idment) Bill 1951 in the Lok 
Sabna on 16th mav, 1951, Loksabna jjecates Part II 
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no taxation" and the latter gave the slogan -" Fraternity 
and Equality Liberty" Similarly, the Preamble oi our 
Constitution gave us the slogan -" Justice, social, eco-
nomic and political,' "which has beer, further elaborated 
by the following clauses of the Freamolei 
-Liberty of Thouguc, ej^ p^ression, belief 
and worship; Lquality of status and 
of opportunity; ana Fraternity assuring 
the* dignity of the inaividual and the 
unity ana integrity of the i,ation". 
All are the fundamentals on which our whole 
2 
Jonstitution edifice is firmly based. 
Fundamental Rights ; 
-^>xt. 12 to 35 of tne Constitution pertain to 
funaamentai rignts, tnese rignts are reminiscent of same 
of tne provisions of the Bill or riighcs in tne U.S. 
Constitution, but tne former cover a mucn wider ground 
than uhe latter. o.lso the U.S. Const.itution declares 
the fundamental rignt m broad and general terms. 5ut as 
no right is aosolute the courts have, in course of time, 
spelled out some restrictions and limitations on these 
rights. The Indian Constitution, however, adopts a 
different approach, some rights are worded generally; in 
2. Hasan, Shariful, Supreme Court: Fundamental Rights 
and Jirective Principles , p. 40 
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respect of some fundamental rights, the axcepcions 
and qualiiica-ion aav3 been formulated ana expressel 
in a co:npendiou3 f-irm in tae constir.u-i.oa its-^ li .-.'a Lie 
in respect of some otner rights, tne constitution con-
fers power on tne j_,egisiature to impose limitations. 
As tne fundamental rights constitute uv and large 
a limitation on tne government, the most i:nportanT: 
proDiem wnicn the courts have facea with wn_ie interpre-
ting tnem nas been to achieve a proper balance between 
tne righrs of the Incividuai ana those of zr.e State or 
society as a whole between inciviaual liberty anc social 
control. This is very dirficult task indeed in these 
cays of development of the country into a social welfare 
stare. on the whole, however, one coula say -chat the 
line has heen constantly snifting in favour of social 
controx. 
rne fundamental rights are not all diszinct and 
mutually exclusive rights. Each freedom nas differsn-c 
aimensions and a law may nave to meet the cnallenge unaer 
various fundamental rights. Thus, a law depriving a 
person of nis per,^ pnax liberty may nave to stand the 
test of ".rts. 14,19 and 21 to be valid. 
jrro-cectiion of Lire ana Personal Liberty: 
'-^ rt. 21 of tne Indian constituuion .ays down that 
ao persoii ihdix be de^ jrivea of nis life or personal 
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iioerty except according to 'proceaure estaDiisned by 
law'. i'o Knov; tne .T.eaning of'xife' ana 'perdonal 
liDerty' under Article 21, it is neceijoary to giance 
tne luterpretatioa given by tne judiciary. 
meaning ot 'lilte* and Personal l,iberty ; 
3 
The majority in Kharaic Singh's case, held the 
word 'life* in r^t. 21, means not merely the righc to 
tne continuance of a person's animal existence, but a 
rignt to the possession of eacn or his organs - nis arms 
ana legs etc, ;Subba Rao and Shah oJ. observed; 
"Tne rignt or personal liberty in /vrt.21 
may be definea as a right of an indivi-
auai to be tree from restrictions or 
encroachments on nis person, .-•nether tnose 
restrictions or encroachments are direcuiy 
imposed or indirectly brought about by 
calculated measures", 'i 
The words 'life* and 'liberty' occur in tne .-^ ifth 
anu Fourteentn ^nehdments to tne u.o. Constitution whicn 
i^roviae tnat, "..o person ... snaij. be ueprived of ^ife, 
liberty or property without aue process of law". 
deriving inspiration and strength from the Jirth 
ana r'ourteentn Amendments or tne U.S. Constitution, and 
relying on Justice r'ieid's opinion expressed in .-iUnn v.. 
Illinois, the supreme Court of India in its majority 
3. rCarax oingn v. State oz .^.P., •->.Iii 1563, S'-. 129b 
4. luid., 12 96 
5. KlSlb) 94 u.o. 113 
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opinion has attempted to explain the 'life* and personal 
liberty in Kharak Singh. 
"By the term 'life' as have used son-ething 
more is meant than mere animal existence. The inhibition 
against its deprivation extends to all these limits and 
faculties by whicn life is enjoyed. The provisions 
equally proiiibits the mutilation of the body or amputation 
or an arra or leg or the putting out of an eye or the des-
truction, of any otner organ of the body through which the 
soul communicates with the outer world By the term 
liberty, as used in the provision something more is meant 
tnan mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds 
6 
of a prison". 
7 
In Kharak Singh, the Supreme Coxirt expressed 
it's willingness to accept tne meaning and significance 
or life' ana 'liberty', given hy Justice ?iel:-, and held. 
"we do not entertain any aoubt that 
tne word 'life' in Art,21 bears the 
same significance. Is then the word 
"oersonai liberty" to be construed as 
excluding from its perview an invasion 
on the part of the police of the sanctity 
o; a man's home ana an intrusion into 
nis personal security ana his right to 
sleep whicn is the normai comfort ana 
a dire necessity for human existence 
6. Ibia. ,r-. 142 
7. Knarak Singh v. State of U.?.,^ Iil 1963 S.C.1255 
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even as an animal? It might not ce 
in appropriate to refer here to the 
words of the preamble to the consti-
tution that it is designed to "assure 
the dignity of the indiviaual" and 
therefore of those cherished human 
values as the means of ensuring his 
ruil development and evolution". 8 
lu is also fruitful to mention uusrice FranK-
9 
furtar's observations in Coloraao's case -
"The secxirity of one's privacy a^ainsr arbitrary 
intrusion by the police, is basis z.o a free 
societv. It is therefore imolicit in 'the conce'^ t of 
ordered liberty' ana as such enforcear)le against:: tne 
States through the due process clause. The knock at the 
door, whether by day or by night as a cireciude tr> a 
search, wichout autnority of law b"t solely on the 
au"cnoricy of the oolice, aia no"c need tne co..i:ientary of 
recent history to be conaemned as inconsistsnn witn tne 
conceotion of human rights enshrined in the history and 
the basic constitutional documents of Englisn soeaking 
^eoole" 
,je have no hesitation in saying that where a 
state affirmatively to sanction such oolice in-cursion 
in to privacy it would run counter to tne guarantee of 
tne r'ourteenth Amenoment". 
R. I b i ^ . / 6, 130 2 
9 . . . o l ; V. C o i o r a c o V194Sj 338 U . o . 25 
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In India the word"liberty" has been qualified 
cy the word "personal", indicar_iny thereby tnat it 
is confined only to the liberty of the persr^ n. The 
other aspect of the liberty nave been prov:i.Ged for 
in other ^rcicles of tne Constitution. The concept 
of personal liberty nas teen succinct-Ly explained by 
-^ icey. Tht= learnea author describes the ^mbit of that 
right thus; 
"The rignt not to be subjected to 
i^ Tiprisonment, arresr or other phy-
cai coercion in any manner that ^^  
does not admit of legal justification". 
Black stnne observess 
"Personal liberty includes "the power to 
locomation of changing situation, or 
removing one's person to whatsoever 
^lace one's inclination may direc-, 
wiuhout imprisonment or restraint, 
unless by due course of law". 11 
12 
In n.,K, Gopalan it is described to mean libert\ 
relacing to or concerning the person or boay of xjae 
individual; and t^^ ersonal liberty in tnis sense is the 
an-citnesis of physical restrains, or coercion. Tne 
expression is wide enough to take in a rign* to be free 
rrom restrictions placed on his movements. ^'he expres-
sion "coercion" in the modern age cannot be construed 
IG. j^ icey, "Cons-cicutional Law, Orh Ed. / ?P. 2C7-2CS 
11. BlacK icone, "Coauuentaries on the laws of "-nglana", 
3ook 1 at p. 134 
!£. ••^.•^. orCpalan v. riadras, 1950 oCl-i aoi^ -ili^  _y50/SC 27 
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in a narrow sense. In an unc iv i l i z ed socie ty where 
there are no inh ib i t ions* only pnys ica l r e s t r a i n t s may 
d e t r a c t from personal l i b e r t y , bur. as c i v i l i z a t i o n 
advances the osychological r e s t r a i n t s are more e f fec t ive 
than phys ica l ones. The s c i e n t i f i c .Tietnods used to 
condi t ion a man's mind are in a r e d sense nhysicai r e s -
craintS/ r-^r they engender pnys ica l fear channelling 
one ' s accions througn a n t i c i o a t e d and ex'-'ected grooves, 
oo a lso crsaxiion of cond i t ions whicn necessar i ly engender 
i n n i b i t i o n s and fear complexes can be described as physical 
res-^ra ints . FuTuher, the r i ghc to personal l i b e r t y takes 
in not only a r i g h t to be free from r e s t r i c t i o n s olaced 
on n i s aiovements, but a l so free from encroacnments on 
n i s p r i v a t e l i f e . I t i s t rue our c o n s t i t u t i o n does not 
.expressly declare a r i g n t to pr ivacy as a fnnaa..;ental '• •, 
r i g h t , but tne said r i g h t i s an e s s e n t i a l ingredient of 
personal l i b e r t y . livery democratic country sanc t i f i es 
domestic l i f e ; i t i s expected to give nim r e s t , physical 
happiness, peace of mind and secu r i t y . 
Procedure e s t ab l i shed by law: Ihe Vth runendment of the 
U.S. Cons t i tu t ion lays aown i n t e r - a l i a t h a t "no person 
sna i l oe deorived of h i s l i f e , .!.iberty or property without 
cue process ot law". This c lause nas been tne most s i g n i -
f icant s ingle source or j u c i c i c ^ review in tne U.j.rt. 
68 
rhe word 'aue' is interpreted as meaning 'just* proper 
or reasonai:xs, . Therefore, the courts can pronounce 
whether a law affecting a person's life, liberty or 
property is reasonable or not. The court aiay declare 
a law inva_id if it does noc accora with its notions 
of what is J usu and fair in the circ^ vunstances. I^ ue 
process envisages tnat the substantive provisions of a 
law snoula ce reasonable and nor aroitrary. Procedure 
aue process envisages a reasonacle proceaure i.e., the 
oerson afzected shoulo. have fair rignr. of hearing which 
includes zour elements; notice, opporrunity ro be neara, 
ana impartial ^^ ribunal and an orderly procecr're. Under 
the conceo-c of'cue nrocess'tne courts become the arbiter 
of reasonableness of both subs-centive as well as oro-
ceaurai .provisions in a la;-v. Ihe v/ord 'due' is of variabi 
content in zhe "due process" conceo^. Ic cenoces "that 
* 
tne law shoula be 'just' but wnat is 'just: anc reasonaole' 
is not a s-^ atic or rigid concen.-c* it varies from siuuatio:: 
to situation ana wnar. may be regaraed as reasonable in 
one situation may noc necessarily be so in anox:her situa-
tion. 
1-i 
I t was contended in Gopalan iihat the exnression 
'procedure e s t ab l i shed by law' in .-irt. 21 v/as synonymous 
with the f a e r i e an conceot -^ f 'orocedurai aue orocess ' 
13* Schwarts*. j^Tverican C^nstircutional.I,aw,- 207 
14, A.X. Go-:;alan v. Iiadras, .k.Z,R. 1950 3,C, 27 
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anci/ therefore, the reasonableness of the Preventive 
ijetention r^t, or for that matter, of any law affecting 
a person's life or personal liiserty, shoula be justi-
ciable in order to assess wnether the -^ erson affec-ce>:L 
was given a right of fair nearing. The court rejected 
tne contention giving several reasons. Tirst, tne 
vvora, 'due' was acsent in nxt. 21. Seconciy, che drafz 
constitution had contained tne words 'due orocess of 
law' but tnese woras were larer drooped and the present 
15 
expression aaopted instead Tnircly, tne .^erican aoc-
trine generated -cne countervailing, but complicated, 
aoccrine of police power to restrict the ambit of due 
process, i.e. tne doctrine of governmental oower to 
reguia-ce private rights in public interest. 
The way the majority nandled Ar-c. 21 in Gocalan 
was not free from criticism. Gopalan was cnaracterisec 
as the 'hign-water mark, of legal positivisiu', coixr-c's 
a^proacn was very s-cricx. and ourely literal and was zoo 
iiiucn coloured by the oositivist or imperative theorv of 
16 
law. The way ort. 21 was interpreted made it important 
agaiiist: legislative power wnich could make any law, how-
ever drastic, to impose restraints on persoiial liberty 
withou;: oeing obligated to lay down any reasonable ..,ro-
ceaure for che purpose. 
15. Tor an account, of the disf^ussion on draf-ing of .-J:-C.2. 
^ee, .-i-us-cin, the Inaian Constit''''tior., iO 1-113 
16. .-^lan Jledhixi, Liza ex ^ :-berty in Reouclican Incia, 2 
w1_I 24^ ^l^cCy 
Haneka Gandhi? The New Approach: 
Gopalan held the field for almost three decades. 
Gopalan settled two major points in relation to ^rt,21. One 
rtTt. 19 and /^ irt. 21 and 22 were mutually exclusive and that Art. 1-
was not to apply to a law affecting personal liberty. Two a law 
affecting personal liberty could not be declared unconstitution^. 
merely because it lacked natural justice or due process. 
17 
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India is a land aiark case of 
tne post emergency period. This case shows how liberal tendencie 
nave inxluenced the Supreme Court in t^ ie matter oz interpreting 
rundamental Rights* particuxarly Art.21. r» great transformation 
nas come out in the judicial attitude towards the protection of 
personal liberty after the traumatic experience of the emergency 
during 1975-77, when personal liberty had reached its nadir. 
oince then the Supreme Court has shown great sensitivity to the 
protection of personal liberty. The Court has re-interpreted 
i^ rt. 21 and practically overruled Gopalan, 
Maneka's passport was impounded by the Central Governmer-
under the passport ^ct S. 10 (3) (c) of tne rict authorises the pass 
port authority to impound a passport if it deems :.t necessary tc 
do so in tne interest of tne sovereignty and integrity of India, 
the security of India, friendly relations of India with any 
foreign country, or in the interest of the general public. 
i-laneka's passport was impounded in the interest of the general 
public. The Court iaia down a number of propositions seeking 
to ifiake .rtXt. 21-mucn more meaningful. 
17. .-^ .I..4. 1973 v3.C. 597 
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First - the court reiterated the proposition 
that Arts. 14/ 19 and 21 were ncz mutually exclusive. 
Inis means tnat a lav; prescribing a procedure ror 
aepriving a person of 'personal liberty' has to oieet 
the requirements of Art. .j^, ^Isc, zhe procedure 
established by law in .^ vrt. 21 must answer the require-
ment of .-vrt. 14 as well. according to Justice -<. Iyer 
no Article in part III of the Gonsritution ( dealing 
with fundamental right) is an is_and. Just as a man 
is not dissectible in to seoarare limbs/ carcizal rights 
in an organic constitution have a synthesis. 
oeconGly - the expression'personal liberty'in 
-Art. 21 was given an expansive in-cerpre-ca-cio.". Ihe 
Court emphasized that the expression 'persona, liberty' 
was of wide attitude covering a variety of rigr.wS "* whicn 
go to constitute the i->ersonal liberty of man". 
Justice onaqwati wnile toucning the reasonacility 
o~ a law/ denriving :;ersonai liberty observed: 
"The principle of reasoaajjleness whicr. 
legally as well as onilosoohically is 
an essential element oi; equality or ur.-z.-
arbitrariness pervaaes Ar-. 14 i i]ce a 
orooaing omni'^resence. -r.us the proce-
dure in Art. 2''/ must be 'right and 
fair' ana not arbitrary, fanciful or 
0;-ares5ive; otherwise, iu would be no 
proceaure at all ana the requirement cf 
Art. 21 would not be sa-*-isfled". IS 
13. -^ianska Ganahi v. union of Inaia, .-w. I,.\. 1-1 z SZ 597 
n 9 
/ ^ 
,Vhy at ail cio we ca""! Maneka Gandhi as a iand-
mark judgmen-c, is that the Suyreme Court has undoubtedly 
expended the contours of •oersonal liberty hy interore-
cing the phrase'proceaura established by law' in such 
a liberal and orogressive manner which has ultiniately 
allowed tne en-cry of Aiuerican 'Due Process of Law' into 
the Indian Gcnstitu-cion. After Maneka Gandhi rne posi-
tion is now, that a law depriving a p-^rson's _ife and 
liberty nas to be satisfied the requirement of justness, 
fairness and reasonableness. The law prescribing a 
procedure to be followed by the detaining aurhority in 
depriving a person of his life or liberty mus-:: be just 
faix" and reasonable. 
CHAPTER - IV 
POLICZ REGVL^TlOiiS A^^ 'iJ RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
IMATURS A^ '^ iD CONCEPT OF PRIVACY -
RIGHT TO PRIVACY lH DINDIA -
PRIVACY IN x'lODERN AGE -
RIGHT TO PRIVACY UNDhIR THE COiMSTITUTIOr; 
DOMICILIARY VISITS 
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In the foregoing Chapter we have discussed 
in detail the concept, ambit and scope on the consti-
tuuional importance of life and personal liberty. 
There has also been a discussion on the historical 
growth and development on personal liberty in America 
and Britain, The recent judicial decisions covering 
Art. 21 of our constitution as has been handled down by 
the apex court shows that Art. 21 has become all em-
brassing and omnipresence. Right to life and personal 
liberty, is the most h\iman cherished right. Keeping it's 
importance in mind, the constitution makers have also 
not subjected it to any reasonable restrictions. It 
therefore seems to be an absolute right. 
This human right of life and personal liberty 
is still placed at the mercy of the police, empowered 
to intruide or violate it under the Police Act or under 
the Police Regulations formulated by the British Raj , 
These Police Regulations were formulated by our colonial 
master to keep a close and secret watch over the move-
ments of the slaves. The British government treated 
us like slaves or as sub-humans. They did not allow 
us to shape or enjoy the fruits of our life and liberty. 
These Police Regulations were drafted by the Britishers* 
for a single purpose and motive to concroi the Indians. 
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Thus these Police Regulations might have been very-
relevant, useful and effective. However the Indians 
were neither naving constitution nor fundamental rights. 
Thus having no conflict or clash with Police Regulations 
and therefore, the continuence of these regulations 
hitting the right to life and personal licerty, is 
contrary to constitutional right. 
The study, therefore, is devoted to pin-point 
as to those Police Regulations which come in conflict 
with certain civil liberties like, personal liberty, so 
that we may able to suggest, the delision of the same, 
Hereinafter, we are therefore, embarking of that course 
of study. 
Section 23 of the Police Act, 1861, provides: 
"It shall be the duty of every police officer prooiptly 
to obey and execute all orders and warrants lawfully 
issued to him. by any competent authority, to collect and 
communicate intelligence affecting the public peace; to 
prevent the commission of offenders and public nuisances; 
to detect ana brine, offenders to justice, and to appre-
hend all persons when he is legally authorised to appre-
hend and for whose apprehension sufficient ground exists; 
and it shall be lawful for every police officer for any 
of the purposes mentioned in tnis section without a 
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warrant* to enter and inspect any drinking shop, 
gaming-house or other place or resort of loose and 
disorderly characters". 
This section gives wider powers to police to 
prevent the Commission of offences, both cognizable 
and non cognizable and to prevent breaches of Excise 
Law. Collecting and communicating intelligence includes 
reports sent by 5.1 to superior officers regarding 
suspicious against a person residing in his jurisdiction. 
State of U.P. like other states has formulated certain 
regulations known as U.?. Police Regulations. Chapter 
XX of tnese regulations which deals "Registration and 
serveillance of bad characters'* is to be sought* viola-
tive of civil liberties and particularly right to 
privacy of an individual. 
Rule 236 of this chapter which provides as under: 
"Viithou-c prejuaice to the right of Superinten-
dents of Police to put into practice any legal measures, 
.such as shadowing in cities, by which they find they 
can keep in touch with suspects in particular local 
ties or special circumstances, surveillance may for 
most practical purposes be defined as consisting of one 
or more of tne following measures: 
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Ca) Secret picketing of the house or approaches to 
the houses of suspects; 
(b) through periodical inquiries by officers not below 
the rank of sub-inspector into repute, habitS/ asso-
ciations/ income, expenses and occupation; 
(c) the reporting by constables and chaxikldars of 
movements and absences from home; 
(d) the verification of movements and absences by means 
of inquiry slip; 
ve) tne collection and record on a history-sneet of 
all information bearing on conauct. 
Besides Rule 236 mentioned above, i^., 195 of 
Chapter XVII which is very much close and akin to 
R. 236, runs as follow; 
"To supplement:, or as an alternative to night 
petrol, pickecs may be posted in town and rural areas -
(1) to watch the houses or approaches to tne houses 
of registered bad characters. 
(2) to intercept criminals on their way to or from 
the scenes of crimes. 
Two men will ordinarily form a picket, but in 
special circumstances e.g. if aangerous criniinals are 
likely to be met, this nxamber must be increased. Picket. 
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should take up their positions without afcxacting 
artantica. They must not .T.ove about or make noise, 
and must be well concealed. Each member of a picket 
should watcn in turn while his companions sleep. 
Should a bad character, whose house is picked/ leave 
it aviring the night, the picket should not ordinarily 
follow him cut shoula watcn for his return. The 
picketing system should be used as a means of con-
trolling bad cnaracters who are suspected to ce tem-
porarily active, and in areas where daccity or bur-
glary is rife", 
l^ arure and Concept of privacy; 
Privacy has long impressed sxirveyors of the 
legal systems as one of the great ideas with which 
the law has grappled in the last hundred years of 
its growth. ^nd the recenr observations of rlatnew, 
1 
J. in Govind v. H.P. have no doubt strengthened the 
conviction of many that tne concept of privacy bears 
witness to tne vigour of our legal and constitu-cional 
systems. Ye-u much of the recognition and protection 
of privacy by law in India is still far behind and its 
future development seems likely to nave a considerable 
i.T.pact on the lives of the individuals. 
1. A.i..^. 1975, o.C. 1378 
The term 'privacy* covers a very broad field 
the bordens of whicn can hardly be precisely laid 
down. Various meanings are attiached to tnis term: 
Keeping one's affairs to one's self/ non-disclosure 
of xnforma-cion by a person abour hiiaself; a desire 
not to be observed by other persons; the privacy of 
tne internal management of a business organization 
or of a government; privacy as a propriexi^r/ interest: 
in one' s own reputation and so on , It .T.ay tnus be 
said tnat privacy is the state of being unooserved 
or unknown^ confidential/ undisturced or scheduled. 
It is the opposite of being public and hence the 
conditioa of not being open to or snarea with tne 
public, Cne*s privacy is invaaea or encroacned upon 
for exaiuple, wnen one's personal letters are publisnec 
or wnen peeping toms watcnes one undress or wnen one 
receives an abscene telephone call or wnen one's 
private talk over telephone is tapped by zne other. To 
some people 'privacy' is the sura of all "private 
Rights" ana some others contemplate a discrete private 
right of privacy, a rignt to be free from physical, 
mental or spiritual violation, a rignt to tne integrity 
of one's personality. 
3y privacy we orainarily mean 'tne rignt to be 
let alone'. This pnrase was found zo be less tnan 
7Q 
helpful by the younger committee in England in its 
Report (1972). This committee was appointed to consider 
whether legislation is needed to give f\irther protection 
to the individual citizen and to commercial and industrial 
interests against instruoions into privacy by private 
persons and organizations or by companies and to make 
recommendations. The Coiiunittee commented: 
"An unqualified right: of tnis kind woula 
in any event be an xinrealistic concept, 
incompatible with the concept of society". 
*\ccording to an American Court privacy is "the 
right to live one's life in seclusion, without being 
2 
subjected to unwarranted and undisired publicity". 
i^ izer also writes that the rignt to "privacv is the indi-
3 
vidual's right to a secluded and anonymous existence . 
4 
L. Lusky describes privacy as "an interest" which some 
one has; that is to say a person would be better off for 
being in a private state. Description of privacy as 
"an interest" naturally presupposes tnat it is something 
a person would be better for having it. This is generally 
true. But privacy does not consist of one particular 
interest only. Tne broader concept of privacy comprises 
various interests and, tnerefore, the right to privacy 
may mean tne right of the individual to lead his own life 
2. Kerby v. nal Roacn Studies,1942,53 Cal.Acg.2Q7,127,f.2nc 
3. Michigan Law Review,1939,P.526 "* 577,579 
4. Invasion of Privacy:a clarification of concepts" 
(1972) 72 Col.Law Review 698 at 709 
n c 
protected against: 
(a) interference with his private, family and 
house life; 
{hj interference with the physical or mental inte-
grity or his moral or intellectual freedom; 
(c) attacks on his honour or reputation 
^d; iaeing placed in a false lignt; 
te) the disclosure of irrelevant, embarrassing 
facts relating to his private life; 
(f) the use of his name, identity or likeness; 
(g) spyinc, prying, watching and besetting; 
(h) in-cerference wita his correspondence; 
^i/ misuse of his private communications, written or 
oral; 
(j) disclosure of information given or received by 
5 
him in circumstances of professional confidence. 
But what is privacy about? Ordinarily speaking, 
it is about information concerning, the person jr group 
of persons ana information i^iay be in relation to many 
things sucn as love, hatrea, triendship, family relation-
ship, erotic relationships etc, .-^ ..r, .lestin regards 
privacy as "the claim of individuals, groups or institu-
tions to aetermine for themselves when, how.and.to what 
5, Conclusions of -the iNioraie Conrerence of Jurists on 
tne .-iight to xiespect for Privacy, .^^lay 1967 
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extent information about them i s communicated to 
6 
o thers" . 
rthar is the decisive element in a breach of 
the boundary that defines the area of privacy? It is 
the acquisition or transmission of private information 
about the person or persons without his or their consenr 
of knowledge. 
Ever since the publication of an article by 
'Warren and Branaeis in Harvard Law Review in 1890/ 
privacy has remained primarily a non-legal concept. 
Even in U.3.A., tne law has not absorbed the concept 
of privacy comfor-cably or made it altogether its own. 
Justice Vlacknan observed than "the U.S. Constitution 
7 
does not explicitly mention any right of privacy". In 
a line of decisions/ however, the court nas recognized 
•cnat a rignt of personal privacy, or a guarantee of 
certain areas or zones of privacy does exist under the 
Constitution. 
Privacy is an aspect of hximan di>^ nity. The right 
to privacy is basic to every individual. Eclipse of 
privacy means eclipse of human dignity also. Justice 
Methew also states tnat there can perhaps be no objection 
in regarding intrusion upon our privacy as a dignity 
tort. The narm caused by this intrusion is incapable 
of being repaired and the loss suffered in digniry is 
6. ."Privacy and Freedom" (1970) at p. 7 
7. Row v« wade C 410 U.S.113) ( 197J ) 
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not susceptible of being made good in damages. Ihe 
injury is to be spiritual element in our otherwise 
8 
mundate composition. 
Law recognizes the concept of 'person', Basic 
to the idea of 'privacy' is the concept of 'person*. 
The concept of 'person' is inherent in the concept of 
'privacy'. ^^JO doubt tne importance of privacy of 
person was recognized and forcefully emphasized by m e 
post Renaissance European society. Bur it does nor 
mean tnar only urbanised, industrialised, capitalisric 
and advanced society ma/ claim to have interests in 
privacy. Recognition and respect of a person as a 
'person' by anotner is to be expected ar least in a 
aemocratic society. Respect for persons has implica-
tions for privacy as well as for freedom. Persons gene-
rally resent being started at/ spied on or gossiped 
about even when no harm is either caused or intended. 
The reason for resentment being tnat persons find them-
selves to be the objects of observation without tneir 
consent. And this is a quite general pri^ aciple of 
9 
privacy, based on respect for persons. Thus invasion 
of privacy is demeaning to individuality; ir is an 
affront to personal dignity. 
8. Justice K.K.i-:athew, 'The Rignt to be Let rtlonevl979) 
4 sec ^Jour. 5ec,)?.3 
9. ^ .l.Benn,,'Privacy, freedom and Respect for Persons' 
at jSomos XIII (1970),PP 4-15) 
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Right to privacy in India; 
The concept of privacy was not unknown in 
ancient India. The Dharmashastras recognized the 
concept of privacy and their commentaries expounded the 
law of privacy. In his Arthashastra, Kautilya prescribe 
procedxire to ensure privacy in consultations with his 
ministers. Thouyn we come across certain legislative 
provisions for the protection of privacy in-terest, 
such as section 50 9 of the Indian Penal Code (1860) . 
Section 13 of the Indian Easement Act (1882; , Section 
26, 164(3) and 165) of the driminax Procedure Code(1898) 
we find thau tne terra 'privacy' is not legislatively 
defined, -\or do we find any definition of this term 
in the judicial pronouncements. 
In modern times/ the rignt to privacy constitute^ 
one of tne foundations of political democracy as it 
had developed from Magna Carta, from the writings of 
the philosophers and from the successive declarations 
of human rights. 
Intrusion into privacy of an individual has 
two aspects: 
(1) Intrusion by private individual and 
l,ii) Intrusion by tne State or by any of its agencies 
But as pointed out by ^r. Cowen in his 2agcre Lectures, 
these two can not be equated. In the interest of 
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secuxity or state and for the detention and prevention 
of crimes/ sometimes the state has to inquire and 
investigate into the private affairs of the indivi-
duals and take appropriate measures. Spying is a 
part and parcel of state craft. It was resorted to 
by the kings in ancient India. Since the rime of Kau-
tilya,it has heen recognized tnat a well-informed admi-
nistration is an essential pre-requisite not only of 
efficient government but also of the maintenance of 
political power. 
Privacy in .-xodern .age; 
I?wo phenomena have played important-aL'nost 
equally important: role in hximan History, The firs"c is 
the agricultural revolution wnich occurred about the 
time of tne Neolithic period wnen man first began his 
tor-cuous patn towards domestica-cion. Initially agri-
culcure became the basis of wealth of man but; then it 
became tangible property as the basis of power* the 
second is the scientific and technological revolution 
which began with the growth of industries and has now 
completely cnanged the environment and man nas begun to 
realise tnat: his institutions - social, economic, poli-
tical ana legal- will be determined more by scientific 
and technological inventions as yet unknown than by 
presently known legal and political doctrines. 
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Alongwith rapid developments in technology, 
communication and commercial enterprise in modern 
times and also the expanding sphere of activities of 
the modern state which threaten to embrace almost every 
aspecr of the individual life, there has emerged a 
growing concern for the preservation of personal privacy. 
rtt a time bugging and other techniques of sur-
veillance have been perfected to an alarming degree, 
the development of computers enables one to store and 
retrieve immensely increased amounts of information 
abouu any specified individual in even very large popu-
lations. Technological development in the field of 
electronics ana computers have made it mucn more diffi-
cult for the individual in the present times to get 
away, physically and psychologically from the people 
who sorround him. Perhaps no other technical innovation 
nas ar fee ted the human life so much as eleccronic com-
puters and telecommunication. The amount of information 
which a computer can keep in permanent storage is astro-
nomically greater than anything with which we are familia 
in our every day lives. Now a days it is increasingly 
becominy economic to store personal data in relatively 
becoming economic to store personal data in relatively 
fas;: on-line memories. Here the problem of protection of 
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personal privacy arises because information supplied 
by, or collected from , an individual for a particular 
purpose may be used in future for a totally different: 
purpose. 
Information or rather access to inforrr.ation in 
modern times, is rapidly becoming the basis of power, 
rtccess to information is genuinely evolving as 'new 
property'. In the past real property was tne basis of 
political power, but in the modern age of science and 
technology,it shifting to the persons who have access 
to advanced infor.nation systems and who car. manipulate 
information to tneir own advantage. Thus '-access to 
information' is the new basis of power and i^ is rspiacinc 
the age old concept of property based power. 
It seems that the problem of protection of privacy 
in tne computer age is one of knowing wnere co strike 
a balance cetween the interest of the individual in 
keeping his affairs to himself and his affairs to others 
so that he may enjoy tne fruits of the more efficient 
and more informed society that results. The real pro-
tection that an individual needs is the righw to know 
what information is stored about him and the right to 
varify that .information. 
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Right to Privacy Under the Constitution; 
Under the Indian Constitution the first remar-
kable case touching the aspects of surveixlance by the 
police and the right to privacy of the individual is 
Kharak Singh v. State of U»P. In a case of dacoity 
in 1941, Kharak Singh was released undersection 169 of 
tne Crirainal procedure Code opened a "rlistory-Sheet" 
in regard to him and ne was put under surveillance. :;: 
i'requently tne Chaukidar Oi. trie Village and so.i.e-times 
police constable'.'!»©-t(?^ :ec\ his house, knocked ana shouted 
ac his door, woke him up during the nignt hours and 
alsturbed his sleep. Often he was comelled to get-u*^  
from his sleep and to accoaipany them to the Dolice 
station to report his presence. Kharajc Singn cnallanged 
the Constitutional validity of chaper XX of the U.P. 
Police x^egulations and the powers conferrea upon police 
officials by its several provisions, specially rule 23^ 
of tne -cvequlation for making secret picketing of the 
house of the survaille, domiciliary visita at -Tignu, etc. 
on the ground that they were violative of the rnndanientai 
rights under Articles 19(1) (d) and 21 of the Constitution 
^ iwiia /iyyangar, J. (For self and Bp Sinha , C.J, Imam 
ana rluaholkar, JJ ) i^ eld; . , , .. , 
iO. ^,1»R, 1963 S.C. 1295 
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"Before entering on the details of these regula-
11 
tions it is necessary to point out that the defence of 
tne State in suooort of their validity is two folds 
tl) that the impungned regulations do not constitute an 
infringement of any of the freedoms guaranteed by oarr III 
of tne Constitution wnich are invoked by the petitioner, 
and ;2J tnat even if they were, they have been framed 
in the interest of tne general public and public order 
and ro enable the police to discharge its duties in a 
raore efficient manner and were therefore "reasonaole res-
trictions "on that freedom. Pousing here it is necessary 
to point out that the secona point uraed is without any 
legal basis for ir the pe-citioner were able to establish 
that tne impugned reaulations constitution infrinnement 
or any of the freedoms Guaranteed to him by the Consti-
tution tnen the only manner in wnicn this violation of 
tne funaam'=»nta 1 rignt could be defenaed would bf» bv justi-
fying tn«=i impugned action by reference to a valid law 
i.e.,be it a statute, a statutory rule or a statutory 
regulation ...... Chapter C^-C had no such statutory basis 
but were merely executive or departmental instructions 
rramed for the guiaance of tne police officers they would 
not therefore be "a law" which the State is entitled to 
make under tne relevant cis. C2) to (6) of Art. 19 in order 
11. U.P. Police Regulations 
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to regula te or c u r t a i l fundamental r i g h t s guaranteed by 
the several s \ ib-clauses or Ar t . 19(1)/ nor would the 
same be"a procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law" within Art, 21. 
The pos i t ion the re fo re i s t h a t i f the act ion of the 
po l i ce wnicn i s tne arm of the executive of the Sta te 
i s found to in f r inge any of the freedoms guaranteed to 
the p e t i t i o n e r , the p e t i t i o n e r would be e n t i t l e d to 
the r e l i e f of mandamus which he seeks to r e s t r a i n s t a t e 
from taking ac t ion under the r e g u l a t i o n s . 
I t i s oiDvious t na r the secrecy here 
r e f e r r ed to i s secrecy, from the suspect ; in otherwords 
i t s piirpose i s to a s c e r t a i n the i d e n t i t y of the person 
or per so:-s who v i s i t the nouse of the suspect, so tha t 
the pol ice might have a record of che natura of "che 
a c t i v i t i e s in wnich the suspect i s engaged. I t was a lso 
submitted t h a t i f the suspect does come to know t h a t 
h i s house i s being sab jec tea to p icke t ing , tha t might 
12 
a f fec t h i s i n c l i n a t i o n to move about or t ha t in any 
event i t woula p re jud ice h i s "personal l i b e r t y " . 
Domiciliary v i s i t s a t n i g h t ; 
"domici l iary v i s i t s " i s defined in the Oxford 
English Dict ionary as " v i s i t to a p r i va t e dwelling, by 
o f f i c i a l persons, in order to search or inspect i t " . 
.Webster's Third New I n t e r n a t i o n a l jJictionary defines 
12. ^s per rtyyangar J. in Khanak oingn, p . 1300 
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the word as "visit to a private dwelling ( as for 
searching itj under authority. The definition in 
Chanibers Twentieth Century i-ictionary is almost iden-
tical - "Visit under authority, to a private house for 
the purpose of searcning it". These visits in the 
context of the provisions in the Regulations are for 
the purpose of making sure tha-c tne suspect is st-aying 
at ho.Tie or wnether he has gone out, the latter being 
presTjmed in this class of cases. It is clear tnat 
having regard to tne plain meaning of m e words ''domi-
ciliary visits"/ "cne police au;:horities are authorised 
to enter the premises oi: tne suspect, knock at tine door 
ana have it opened and search it for tne purpose of as-
certaining his presence in the house. 
On the other hand Subba Rao J. i,for self and 
Shah J.) held: 
"We agree witn him (Raj agopala «yyangar/u. / tnat 
regulation 236(b) is unconstirutional, but we would go 
further and hold that the entire Regulation is unconsti-
tutional on the ground that it infringes bouh Art. 19 (1) 
id) and Art. 21 of the Constitu-cion . 
Tnis petition raises a questisOm of far reacning 
importance, namely, a right of a citizen of India to 
lead a free subject to social control iraposed by valid 
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lav;, the fact that the question has been raised at 
the instance of an alleged disreputable character 
shall not be allowed to deflect our perspective. If 
the police could do what they did to the pe-citioner, 
they coula also do the same to aa honest and. law abiding 
13 
citizen. 
The majority judges in this case had come to tne 
conclusion that so far as tne right of the people to be 
secure was concerned/ it must be included in Art. 21 in 
as much as unauthorised intrusion into a person's home 
and the disturbance caused to him thereby is* as it 
were, tne violation of a common law right, .of a man, an 
essential of ordered liberty if. not of the very concept 
of civilization, 
14 
In Govind v, M»P. tne Supreme Court had another 
occasion to examine the constitutional validity of 
r^ e-iularions 855 and 856 of iladhya Pradesh Police Regu-
lations purporting to have been made by the Government 
of l-i,P» under section 46 ;,2} (c) of tne Police Act which 
says: 
See.46 (2) when tne whole or any part of this 
Act shall have been so extended, the State Government 
may, from time to time, by notification in zhe official 
13, «s per Subba Rao,J. in Karak Singh, P. 1303 
14. r», i.A. 197 b SC 1378 
^ L 
Gazette, make rules consistent with this Act -
(c) generally, for giving effect to tne provisions of 
this riCt, 
Reguiauion 856 is in pari materia with Regulation 
236(b) of the U.P. Police Regulations which runs as 
unaer -
Regulatioii iio^o-
Surveillance may, for practical purposes* 
oe defined as consisting^of the following measures: 
\Q.) Thorougn periodical enquiries by tne station 
house officer as to repute,habits, association, income 
expenses ana occuparion. 
tb) Domiciliary visits botn by day and night at 
present but irregular intervals. 
c^) Secret picketing of the house and a^ p^roacnes 
on any occasion wnen the surveillance (surveillant?) 
is found absent, 
(bj i^ /omicilary visits both by aay and night at 
frequent out irregular intervals. 
(c) Secret picketing of the house and approacnes 
on any occasion wnen the surveillar.ee vsuryeiilant ?) 
is rouna aosent. 
d^; Ihe reporting oy PateIs, mukaddaras and kotwars 
of movements and absences from home; 
(e) The verification of such movements and absences 
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by means of bad character rolls. 
\,z) The collection in a history-sheet of all infor-
mation beacj^ ng on conduct. 
State in this case contended that: petitioner 
is a dangerous criminal wnose conudct shows that he 
is determined to ieao a criminal life and that he was 
put under surveillance in order to prevent m m from commi 
ttng offenC«s^ 
raxing recourse to section 23 of the Police 
t^cv. ^whicn provides-that " it shall be the duty 
of every police officer to prevent tne commission of 
offences and public nuisance ") the Supreme >^ o\irt 
neld that Regulation d55 ana 856 have tne force of law 
and that any were not violative of Art.. 21. 
however Justice I'iatnew, spearcing ror the court 
in chis case , observed; pursuit of nappiness. 2hey 
certainly realised the significance of a man's spiritual 
nature, of his feelings/ nis intellect, and tnat only a 
part of tne pain, ^jleasure, satisfaction of life can 
be found in material things and, therefore, they must 
be deemea to nave conferrea upon the indiviaual as 
against tne government of spnere where they should be 
let alone". 
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He xur ther co)Tutient.ing on functioning of 
machinery under tnese r e g u l a t i o n s , s a i d : 
" I t must be remembered t h a t tne sures t way 
of dr iving a man to a l i f e of crime i s to prevent him 
zrom earning an honest l i v i n g . Surveil lance snouxd 
tne re rore , never be an impediment to steady employmenu 
an^ snouxa noi:. be .T»ade unnecessa r i ly irksome or 
nuini l ia t iag . The person under survei l lance shoulo/ i f 
poss ib le be a s s i s t e d in f inding steady employment 
and the p r a c t i c e of warning persons against employment 
and the p r a c t i c e of warning persons against emoloying 
15 
nim must be s t rongly CLiscouraged, 
I t appeaxs t n a t J u s t i c e liathew was inc l ined to 
assume tne ex is tence of the r i g h t to privacy under 
tne cons-citution. In fac t / the Supreme Court agreed 
t h a t privacy i s mainly a person or ien ted concept 
and/ tnerefore i t r e l a t e s to and overlaps witn the 
concept of l i b e r t y . J u s t i c e Mathew made reference to 
some American cases on p r ivacy ^e. g.Griswold v. Connec-
16 17 18 
t i c u t Row V, »jade/ Olmsted v. United States and i t 
appears tna t he i s p o s i t i v e l y inc l ined to accept the 
American theory of penumbras to locate tne r i g n t to 
1 5 . rts p e r Mathew J , i n G o v i n d v , M , ? , / P . 1 3 8 1 
1 6 . a 9 6 5 ) 381 U . S , 419 a t r-. 510 
1 7 . a 9 7 3 ) 410 U . o , 113 
1 8 . (1927) 277 U . S . 438 
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privacy in /^ticles 19 tl) (a), 19(1) (d) and 21. F.S. 
Nariman has rightly observed, that "with dexierous 
judicial steering and mild under statement (in Govind 
case) , tne Supreme Court has given to the right of 
19 privacy a foothold in the Fundamental Rights Chapter** 
Prof. Upendra Baxi has rightly pointed out that "Govind 
is anxious to preserve the rich indeterminacy anc open-
texture of tne rignt to privacy, continuing cne i^soira-
20 
tion of justice oubca Rao in Kharak Singh. 
Recently, the apex court of India has laid with 
regard to the invasion of privacy by a police officer thar. 
"I-ven a woman of easy virtue is entitled to privacy and 
no one can invade her privacy as and when he likes, 5o 
also it is not open to any and every person co violate 
ner person as and wnen he wishes. She is en-citled co 
protect her person if tnere is an attempt to violate it 
against her wish. She is equally entitled to the protec-
21 tion of law". 
19. The American Advocate , J a n . - J u n e , 1977, Vol.X'/Zl, 
a t P. 83 
20. K.K. Ma chew on Democracy, E q u a l i t y and rreedc:a, ed . 
by Prof . S a x i , P . LXXIV. 
2 1 . « s p e r rkhmadi J , i n S t a t e of Maharasht ra v. Madhukar 
j.-iarayan Madikar, A . I . K . li»91 S.C, 2 0 7 , a t p . 211 
CHAPTEii - V 
POLICE RilGULATIOiNS rtiNJD FREEDOM 
P « K T - ^ : FREEDOM OF HOVEI-iENT - SUSPICION 
NOT GUIDED -
P^\RX - 3 ; HISTORY SHEET - ARREST - SEARCH 
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PART - rt 
Clauses (a) to {g) of Art. 19(1) guarantee to the 
citizens of Inaia si>c freedoms/ viz./ of 'speech and ex-
pression'/ 'peaceable asseiubly*/ 'association', free move-
ment, 'resiaence'/ ana 'practicing any profession and 
earring on any business'. These various freedoms are 
necessary noc only to proraore certain basic rights of the 
citizens but also certain democratic values in, ana tne 
one ness of, cne country. .nccoraing to tne oupreiae Court, 
it is possible tnat a right does not find express .-enuion 
in any clause of .orz.. 19 <1> and yer it may oe covered by 
2 
some clause tnerein. This gives an additional uinension 
to ^U 19 a} . 
These freedoms are not abso lu te , so clausesU) to 
vo; of .-u:t. 19 lay down the grounas and the purposes for 
wnicn a l e g i s l a t u r e can impose ' reasonable r e s r r i c - i o n s ' 
on tnese r i g n t s . They serve a two fold purpose viz, on 
tne one hana, tney speciry t h a t these freedoms are not 
absolu te ly buu are subject to r e g u l a t i o n ; on the ozr.er nana 
they pur. a l i m i t a t i o n on tne power of a l eg i s l a tu r e zo 
r e s t r i c t tnese freeaoms. Three s i g n i f i c a n t cha raczs r i s t i e s 
of these c l auses may be noted. F i r s t , tne r e s t r i c t i o n s 
under them can be imposed by execut ive ac t ion alone without 
!»• wr i ^ ina l l y , r t r t . 19 guaranteed seven freedoms. The 
freedom to hold and acquire proper ty was repealed in 197c 
2. i-xaneka Gandhi v. IR 1978 5.C. 597 
97 
there being a law to back it up. Secondly/ each restric-
tion must be reasonable. Thirdly, a restriction must 
be related to the purposes mentioned in these clauses. 
There is thus a double test to adjuage tne validity of a 
restriction \.l) whether it is reasonable; C2) whether it 
is for a purpose raencioned in the clause under whicn the 
restricrion is being imposed? 
.^ rt. 19 CI) Cd) guarantees to every citizen the right 
to move freely throughout tne territory of India. Art. 19 
\1) ve; cfuarantees to a citizen the right to reside and 
settle in any part of India. Thougn, according to Arn. IS 
KDj , however/ the sr-ate may impose reasonable restrictions 
on these rignts by law in rhe interest of general public 
or for tne protection of tne interest of the Schedule 
Tribe. 
H'viQ. right/ of movement and residence go togerher 
in mos"!: cases for when a person is asked to '^ir a parti-
cular place. 
Under tne Bombay Police Act, the Commissioner of 
Police could direct a person to remove himself from Greater 
Bombay for a perioa up to rwo years if K1) the Conimissioner 
was satisiiied that nis acts were calculatec co cause alarm 
or danger -co person or property or cnar ne was about to 
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commit an ozrence involving violence or force; and 
(ii) in nis opinion, witnesses were not fortncoming 
to testify against nim in public. The person concernea 
haa some procedural: he was to nave in writing the main 
allegations against hiia; he was to have an opportunity 
•CO explain tne aliejati:^ns; he could appear through a 
lawyer and proauce witnesses to clear his character. He 
could appeal to tne State Government against the extern-
ment order and could resort to a court on certain grounds. 
Tne a^u^ reme Court held the law valid under ^rt. 19(.5) as 
the restrictions had been Imposed to protect the public 
from dangerous and bad characters; there were many safe-
goiards and the maximum time-limit for an externment order 
3 
could only be two years. 
4 
Earlier in Gurbachan Singn v. Sombav where the 
petitioner cnallenged an externment order, made under sec, 
27 vl) . City of Bombay Police i^t., 1902/ directing him to 
remove himself outsiae Greater Bombay, on the ground that 
tne section authorising tne making of the order violated 
Art. 19(1} (a) and e^} . in upholding 5ec. 27 \.i;, the court 
held tnat the section i-r.posed reasonable restrictions in 
tne public interest botn in its substantive and proceaural 
requirements. The siibstantive requirements were reasonable 
because the order could not remain in force for mora than 
3, r-^ari v, e^::.utv Conimr. of Police, ^ 1^% 1959, B.C. 559 
4. vl^52) o.C.A. 737, ('52) A,B.C. 221 
QC, 
to/ V ^ 
two years and could be cancelled earlier in a proper 
case by tne Commissioner. The procedural requirements 
were reasonable because the proposed externee was to be 
told the material allegations against him and had an 
opportunity of meeting them* with a right to appear 
by a lawyer and with the right to lead evidence as to 
cnaracter. The denial of the rignt to cross-examine 
police informants arose from the fac-c that the law aeal : 
witii exceptional cases,where fear of harm to their 
persons and proper-cies made persons afraia to depose 
in puolic against bao Ciaracters. The whole object 
of tne law would be defeated if sucn cross examination 
b 
were-allowed. 
6 
However in .-l.P. v. Baldeo Prasad S3. 4 ana 4:^ . , 
J , p . Ec i^arar Uoondas .i-iCt, 1946, as amendea in 1950/ 
author ised the D i s t r i c t i - iagistrate, in an drea declared 
by the o ta t e Government as c i s tu rbed to c i r e c t a "goonuc. 
not to remain witnin, or en t e r xnto, a specified p a r t 
of tne a i s t r i c t i f ne was s a t i s f i e d t n a t n is presence 
was p r e j u a i c i a l to tne i n t e r e s t s or the general public 
iTidequate procedural safeguaros were provided but the 
cju^reiae Jou r t aec la rea tne ' ^ c t i nva l id ' on the grouna 
i n t e r a l i a , t ha t a d e f i n i t i o n of a 'goonda' afforded 
no a s s i s t ance to deciding who f e l l in the category. 
5. oeervai , .i.i'i., C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Law of India, Vol. 1 a t 
6 . « . I . . x . 1961 o . C . 1 9 3 ; U 9 6 1 ) 1 oCR 970 P-^-^^ 
IQO 
•Goonda" had been defined as meaning a hooligan, roug.e 
or a vagabond and included a person who was dangerous 
to public peace or tranquility. This was an inclusive 
definition; it did not inaicate any tests to be applied 
to deciue whether a person fell in the firsc part of the 
detinition, and it was left to the unguided ciscretion 
of tne magistrate to treat any citizen as a goonda which 
was nardly proper. It will be appreciated that the 
Court nas snown a tougher attitude in this case than in 
Bombay case, insceaa of tne fact tnat the discretion 
conferred in the Bombay «ct was mucn broader than in this 
case. 
The above cases appear to establisn m a t a person 
can be externed from a local area on the grounds menrionec 
in i^rr. 19 (.5) . The power to make such an order may be 
left to the subjective satisfaction of an adninistcative 
officer, subject to some substantive and procedural safe-
guards. The grounds served on an externee snould not: be 
vague, inaefinite or incomplete and they snouj-d have a 
cirect bearing on the purposes for which an externment 
oraer can be mace under tne relevant law. Ihe externee 
shouxd be given an opportunity to make a representation 
or of being heard against the order of externment. This 
apoears co be the minimal oroceaural safeguard which 
7 a 
snouia be given to the externee . In rre.-n Cnang v, Inci 
7. Kaj a Suknaanaa v. otate, -.•^I^'l 197 2, i->.li. 4 55 
o. i-ili< 1981 o.C, 613 
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the Supreme Court quasned externment proceedings by 
the police against tiie jjeti-cioner v under tne 2elhi 
i-olice ^^t, 1978; on the ground of ~iisuse of power ana 
laia aown rne following guidelines for the use of such 
jjower: 
"^nere must be a clear ana present cancer based 
upon crecible .Tiaterial wnicn maks tne .-novements ana acts 
OL tne person m question alar.'aing or aangerous or frauc; 
with violence. Likewise, tnere .i^ usr ce sufricienr reason 
to bexieve tna-c tne person proceeded againsu is so des-
perate ana dangerous thar. nis mere ^resence in _.elhi or 
any part tnereof is nasaraous to ius commun^ -cy ana its 
safety .ja-cur=,l justice nust be fairly ccnaw^ ied wit: 
and vague allegations and secre~ neajr-^ri'^s are gross 
violations of ^rt. 14,19 and 21 of the Cons-u.iwU-::ion''. 
In many cases Aadr^St -n P. .-urumu^ har) v. inadras 
oo. D,6 and 16 vl) / .-laaras xiestrictions of riabacual Offen-
ders rict. 1948, imposing restrictions on tne right of 
free movemenr. of haoitual offenders, Hyderabad in r^ nanr 
10 
Reddv V. rivderabad, 3. 26 Hyderabad City Police «ct^l348J 
wnicn conrained provisions for making a person reside in 
a particular olace, restrict free movement: and rignt to 
11 
resiae any wnere Calcutta in oniva .Canaan v. W.3., S. 7, 
9 . vl :?i3J .-iad. 9 3 7 , (b3)a . , . - i . 664 
1 0 . I , ' 54 ; .-L. llyd. 2 2 1 
1 1 . v ' 5 4 } ^. C a l . 60 
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Police r<;t 1661, the provisions of o, 7 {bj which pres-
cribed confinement in quarters for a period not exceeaing 
fifteen days. In all above cases court held that the 
restriccion maae on free inovemer.t or for residing, were 
reasonable. 
rtgain many provisions of 'J.P. Police Regulations 
like, the provisions .Tiencioned above i, in other states) 
and decided bv the Court also came before tne court in 
12^ 
Kharak Singh's case, where police surveillance of activi-
ties of persons suspected of criminal habits or tendencies 
secret picketing of the house domiciliary visits at nights, 
and snadowing the movements of the suspect, were challenge^. 
besides «r-c. 21, on tne grouna of -^>rt. 19 (1) \:.) . The Court, 
ruled by a majority that no aspect of police surveillance 
iei.1 within the scope of ^rt. 19 ;1) (d) . It was saia that 
tne purpose or secret picKeting was only to iaentiiy 
tne visitors to the suspect so that police mignt nave 
some iaea ^f nis activities and this dio not affect nis 
rignt of movement in any material form. rtgainst tne 
validity of the snadowing of suspects movement it was 
argued taat if a person suspected tnat nis movement' s were 
ceiag watcned by tne police, it would induce in him a 
psycnologicai ianioitioi. against luoveaient and this woula 
12. ^,1,R. 1963 o.C. 1295 
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infringe Art.. 19(1) (d) which should be interpreted as 
postulating freedom not only from physical, but even 
psychological, restraints on .a_person* s moinent. Rejecting 
this argument/ the majority ruled that H^jrt. 19 U) (d) 
guarantees freedom from physical, direct and tangible 
restraints; it has no reference to 'mere personal sensi-
tiveness' or the imponderable effect on the mind of a 
person wnich might guide his action in the matter of 
his movement or loccmation' . On this view, domiciliary 
visits were held to fall outside Art. 19(1) (d) as a knock. 
at the door, or rousing a man from his sleep does not 
impede or prejudice nis locomotion in any manner. The 
minority view whica was wider in defining tne content of 
the right under Art. 19(1) (d) . As state argued that it 
simply means that a person can move physically from one 
point to another without any restraint. This argument 
ignores the adverb "freely" in clause (d). If that adveJcb 
is not in the clause, there may be some justification 
for this contention; but the adverb "freely" gives a 
larger content to tne freedom. nere movement unobstructec 
by physical restrictions cannot in itself be the object 
of a person's travel. A person travels ordinarily in 
quest of some objective. He goes to a place to enjoy, to 
do business, to meet friends, to have secret and intimate 
consultations with others and to do many other sucn things. 
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If a man is shadowed, his movements are obviously cons-
tric-ted. He can move physically, bur ir can only be a 
movement of an automotion. How could a movement under 
tne scru-ciniziny gaze of the policeman be described as 
a free movement? The whole country is his jail. The 
freedom of movement in clause(d) tnerefore must be a 
movement in a free country,i.e. in a country where he 
can do whatever ne likes, speak to wnomsoever he wants, 
meet people oz his own choice without any apprehension, 
subject of course to the law of social control. 
To make the point clear an illustration can be 
made. A visitor, whemer a wife, son or friend, is 
aliowed to be received fay a prisoner in the presence or 
a ijUard. xx.^ xx;;xxxxxxxkxx2cxxxjocx;cx;c<-xjocxxxx^ cx^  The 
prisoner can speak with tne visitor; but, can it be 
suggested tnat he is fully enjoying tne said freedom? 
Is it possible for him to express his real and intimate 
13 
thoughts to the visitor as fully as he would like ?'• 
dUSPICI^i^ - \^0T GUIDED; 
In U.P. Police Regulations, like most other regu-
lations police nas been equippea with the arm of suspicion 
whenever the police officer, entitled to, under police 
regulations, looks on others with suspicion, may create 
trouble to the liberties of an individual. To make a 
13. per Subca Rao,o. in Kharak Singh at p. 1306 
10G 
history sheet under Regulation 22S of U.P. Police Regulations 
Picketing and surveillance, can be ordered merely on sus-
picion, wnich is not only discretionary but also arbitrary 
14 
why tne Supreme Court directed in Govind's case that police 
surveillance will have to be restricted to such persons 
on-7 against wnom reasonable ma-cerials exist to induce the 
opinion that tney show ' a determination to lead a life of 
crime* __ 'crime in this context being confined to sucn as 
involve puDlic peace or security onxy and if they are dan-
gerous to security risks' Similarly domiciliary visits 
ana secret picketing by tne police should be restrici^d to 
clearest eases of danger to community security shoxilc not 
be resorted to a routine follow-up at the end of a convic-
tion or release from prison or at the whim of a police 
officer. The Court also administered a warning that tnese 
oia regulations 'ill-accord witn tne essence of personal 
freedom' verge ' perilously near unconstitionality' and 
tnerefore need ro be revised. 
14. rt.L.'t. 1975 o.C. 1378 
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PART - a 
In Part ^, we examined certain Police Regulations 
whicn restrain tne rreedom of movement of a person, at the 
discrerion of executive authorities. ..e also observed the 
judicial attituae towards tne said provisions. wow in 
Part B also, the attempt has been made to disclose some 
otner Police Regularions, naving the support from Criminal 
history sheet,to arrest a person and making 
ProceGure Code, Making/a searcn, are the points for study, 
wnicn grossly violate the personal liberty. 
Rule 110 - of tne U.P. Police Regulations provides that 
the stage of the proceedings at whicn the investigating 
officer arres^ cs a suspected person under section 41(1) of 
Criminal Procedure Coae,is left to his discretion he may, 
what a suspect, but may not restric-c his movements without 
arresting him nor compel him to remain in atteacence as a 
witness. 
oo the aiscretion given in this regulation via 
section 41 of criminal procedure code is no more reasonable, 
and is unguidea, unfattered discre-cion, ^ police man can 
restrain a person without a warrant of magistrate, merely 
on his suspicion wnac may be a suspicion, no one can 
confinea and cribbed, it may differ person to person, in 
otherwords we may say it ^ nay be a wnim of an individual. 
Rule 250 - of U.P. Police ^regulations labelled the history 
sheet and list of bad characters as confidential and so an 
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authorised person do not obtain access to them. To 
whom we can say unauthorised person. Is a person listed 
in it, unauthorised? and then he has no right to go 
througn his nistory sheet, or register in which he has 
15 
been registered. The case of Halak oingn wnere right 
of person whose name was included in surveillance register 
to be given opportunity to show causes against such 
inclusion/ was considered hy the apex court. Under ^ule 
23,7 of the Punjab Police Rules a person whose name is 
included in the surveillance register cannot have a 
genuine cause for complainr. Hisrory-sheets and surveillance 
registers have to ce and are confiaential documen-cs. 
i-Meither tne person v/nose name is enterec in the register 
nor any other me.-nber of the public can have access to the 
surveillance register. In this case Halak .Singh along wir. 
his brother Jaswant Singn, businessman in Amritsar, were 
charged for many offences, but all criminal cases were 
ended either in acquittal or discharge. They were also 
detainee in MI3A, but Advisory Board refused to confirm 
their aetenrion. Their names were enrereu in tsie surveil-
lance register mainrainea at the Police Station '.-i' Divi-
sion . rtmritsar, whenever a Senior Police Officer vists 
tne Police ^cation cne appellants were required to attend 
tne Police station along witn otner persons whose names 
15. i-ialak Sincn v. State of Punjab, AIR 1981 SC 76C, 
1981,Cr.L.J. 320 
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were entered in the surveillance register. They were 
also needlessly asked to associate themselves with 
various investigations thougn they have nothing what-
ever to do witn those investigations. They challenged 
tne inclusion of their names in surveillance register 
witnout any justification. With the aiscreet surveillance 
of su3.vectS/ habitual and potential offenders, may be 
necessary ana so the maintei:.ance of nistory sheet and 
surveillance register may be necessary too, for tne pur-
pose of prevention of crime. But at the same time, the 
nacure and cnaracter or the function involved in -che 
making of an entry in the surveillance register is so 
utterly adminstrative and non-judicial that iz. is diffi-
cult to conceive of the application of the rule of audi 
alteram partem. Though Court sacrificea the rule of 
natural justice on the alter of, that it may defea-c the 
object of the rule ana hence tne end of justice. But at 
cne same time Court warned "But all this does not mean 
tnat the police have a licence to enter the names of 
whoever they like (>dislike) in the surveillance registar; 
nor can the surveillance sucn as to squeeze the fundaments 
freedoms guaranteed to all citizens or to obstruCw tne 
free exercise and enjoyment of those freedoms; nor can 
the surveillance to intrude as to offend the dignity of 
tne individual." ° 
16. --^s per Chinnappa i<.eQdy J. in ..lalak iingh at p. 763 
1GS 
Chapter XIII of the U.P. Police Regulations 
deals with ^rrest Bail and Custody. Rule 147 of it says 
«iiy Police Officer may cause any person whom 
he is empowered to arrest under section 54\,1} v, l^ ow 
secrion 41,2; or tne Coce of Criminal Procedure to be 
arresred t/ giving to any other police oriicer enrolled 
under tne ^olice «ct Idol tne inrormation wnich wi_l 
j ustif y tna-c officer in making the arrest in the exercise 
of nis own powers under tnat section 
liow question is what is arrest. ^rrest -eans 
tne aeprivacion of a person of his liberry by legal 
authority or an least by apparenr. legal authority. Tor 
instance, wnen a police officer apprenends a pick-pockec 
he is arresting tne pick-pocket; but a dacoit apprehends 
a person witn a view to extract ransom, tne dacoit is 
not arresting tnat person but wrongfully confining tnat 
^erson. oecondly, every compulsion or physical res-
traint is not arrest but when the restraint is total 
ana deorivation of liberty is complete that wouia amount 
17 
to arrest. 
17. Kelkar, R. V. ou t l i ne s of Criminal Procedure,?. 48 
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Section 41 confers very wide powers on the police 
in order that they may act swiftly for the prevention or 
detection of cognizable offences without the formality 
and delay of naving to go to a magistrate for order of 
arrest. Courts snould therefore be particularly vigilant 
to see tnat tne powers are not in any way abused or lightly 
used for the satisfaction of private feelings or of designin.. 
la 
complainants. 
^s observed in a^case, the arrest and detention of 
persons without warrant are not matters of caprice but are 
governed by rules and principles clearly laid down by law. 
To arrest oersons without justification is one of the most 
19 
serious encroachment upon the liberty of subject . The 
duty of tne police when they arrest without warrant is/ no 
aou£it, to be quick to see the possibility of crime, but 
equally they ought to be anxious to avoic mistaking the 
innocent for the gx^ lty where there is no canger of the 
person who has ex hypothesi aroused their suspicion, that 
he is probably is an "offender" attempting to escape they 
should make all presently possible enquiries from persons 
present or immediately accessible who are likely to be 
able to answer their enquiries forthwith. Ihe police 
snould act >on the assumorion that their _riina .facie suspi-
"20 
cian may be ill-founded. 
l b . Sarkar ,Frabnas o . ^ . ' J a r k a r on Cr imina l Procedure , P. 47 
l b . fcamprit . t^ i r v . .^-mperor, rt. I . i^. 1926 lax., 560 
20. Duiitbell v. i<oberts (19'*-) 1 i^ALL Lii 326 Cn. 
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The power is discretionaxy ana must not be used 
in simple iDailaole offences unless there is reasonable 
ground of absconding when there is "reasonable suspicion" 
or "credible inforn.ation' (post} of the commission or a 
serious offence or such an offence is about to be committee 
arrest should no douot be made. In ordinary cases the 
complainant should be directed to go to a magistrate for 
a warrant. The police Officer .-nay witnouc arresting keep 
watch and tnen arrest if subsequent events justify sucn 
action. But no restraint can be lawfully exercised over 
a person so long as he is not arrested. The police can not 
pursue their investigations by defying the provisions 
under the colourable preten-cion tnat no actual arrest has 
been made when to all intents and i^irpose a man has been 
21" 
in their custody or in detention, 
Sssential Conditions for arrest; 
1^) Commission of cogni<iable offence or reasonaole com-
plaint concerning it; 
^2; reasonable suspicion i.i,e, founded on some definite 
facts) but not bare suspicion or surmise; or 
v3) credible inforiaa-cion Ci.e. sufficiently likely to be 
believable and from reliable source) of a person's 
having been concerned in any cognizable offence, and 
4^) exercise of personal responsibility and personal judge-
ment in making arrest without reliance on the belief 
,'* 
of any o t h e r p e r s o n . 
2 1 . i'laaan v . £mperor Clobb) .-»,,i^  bb* u ' . B . ; 
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SEARCH; 
Rule 154 of the U.P, Police Regulations relating 
to search provides/ that the search of an arrested 
person under section 51 ^ new section 5li,lJ of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure should be made in tne presence of 
two witnesses unconnected witn the police/ whenever such 
witnesses are available. All property of whicn police 
take possession should be marked and entered in a list. 
Searches snould be made with tne consideratica and in 
sucn privacy as may in each case, be possible. Undue 
exposure of tne person shoula be avoided. 
-•^ par- from it the Criminal proceaure Code contains 
four groups of sections to reguia-ce searcnes con-cerplatea 
by it. Section 131 vnew) provides for tne search oz arres: 
persons. Sections, 97, 99, 100 and 103 occurring in 
Chapter VII vSections 100 to 10 3 in Chapter VII of tne 
Code,1898} deal witn search under search-warrants issued 
by i-iagistrates. Section 100 ^section 97 new, deals with 
searcn or persons wrongfully confinea. Section ICI 
^section 9y, newj makes tne provisions of s^ections 38,70, 
72, 74, 77, 78 and 79 { Sections 43,75,77,79,32,83 and 84 
••/' 
or ISyS) app l icab le to search-warrants issued under sec-
t i o n s 93, :;4,95 or sec. 97 (sect ion 96,98,99-A, ICO of the 
Code, 1898) Section 100 U) to (3) ^Section 102 of tne 
Code,1398) dea ls witn search of a c losed p lace . Section 
100 U) to ^3) (sect ion 103 of tne Code, 1895) , provides 
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the procedure for the search. Under it two respectable 
in habitants of the locality have to be present to 
22 
witness the search. 
In Chapter XI ^Chapter X;iI,old), Section 153(new) 
other provisions where a police officer can make a search 
without a warrant are contained. The fourth group of 
provisions is in Chapter Xll (.Chapter XIV of tne Code, 1898J 
which provides for searcnes by a police officer during 
tne investigation of a cognizable offence. Section ]65 (new. 
It enables a police officer to nake a search wimout a 
warrant. For it a warrant under section 94 of zhe Criminal 
xrrocedure Code (.Section 98 of une Code, 1898) is not a 
23 
condition precedent. 
24 
In State v. Laxmi narayan an appeal against acquittal 
tne question arose whether an .-additional i3iscr:.c-o Superin-
tendents of Police could issue a warrant for enrry into 
a common gaming-nouse and effecting search seizure and 
arrest therein. The question was considered in uhe light 
of the provisions of tne Indian Police Act, 1661. It is 
clear from Part 2 of Section 4 of tne Police nct 1861 that 
tne administration or police of a district is to vest in a 
Jisurict SUj^erintenaent and sucn other Assistant District 
Superintendents as tne State Govt, shall consider necessary. 
22. Witter- v". 'Police ijiaries ', Vol. 1 P. 496 
23. ibid. 
24. A. I.ft. 1965 Kaj . 5 at p, 6 
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In criminal case the question often arises whether 
tne police has acted legally in tne exercise of its 
powers or discharge of its duries. The bonafides of 
•cne police are often assailed, a safeguard against which 
is strict compliance with tne law. In State of Rajasthan 
2D 
V. Ren.Tian, it nas been pointed out by oubba Rao, J, who 
aeiivered tne judgment on behalf of the Court: 
"Under section 165 (.new) four conditions are 
imposeG ^1; c.ie ^ olice officer must have reasonable 
ground for believing that, any tniny necessary for the 
purpose of an investigation of an offence cannot in his 
opinion, be obtained otnerwise than by making a search 
witnour. undue delay, (ii) he should recora in writing the 
ground of his belief and specify in such writing as far 
as possible the tnin^ s^ for which tne search is to be made 
viii; ne must conduct the search, if practicable, in persor 
o£ ^ ivj if it is not practicable to make the search himself, 
ne must: recora in writing the reasons for not himself 
making tne search and shall authorise a subordinate officer 
to make the searcn. ^s search is a process exceedingly 
arbitrary in cnaracter stringent statutory conditions are 
imposed on the exercise of tne power". 
25 
I n C h a n d e r P r a s a d v . Empero r , Khwaj a i-iohammad ..>.oor,J. 
h e l d ; 
2D, rt.I.R.. 1560 O . J , 210 a t P . 212 
2 6 , « . I . R , 1937 p a t bO1 
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"The recording of reason before search 
is providea for both under the criminal 
procedure code ana unuer tne Excise net 
and is intended to protect the liberty of 
citizens and avoid useless and unjustified 
searches. If an orficer before proceeaing 
to search has to record his reason, he 
will have to apply his mind to the facts 
and the sufficiency of the information on 
the basis of wnicn ne wants to search." 
In thar case, admittedly no reason was recoraed 
before attempt to search was made and in tha-c view of 
tne matter the conviction under section 35 3 of -che 
Penal Code was set aside. 
«fter examining these provisions, of arrest and 
search, it seems tnat "credible information" and 
"reasonaole suspicion" may be used some times by ^ olice 
officers for tne purpose of narassment of the iadividuax 
citizen. Under tne pretext of suspicion any citizen, 
particularly poor, illiterate people ana persons living 
in tne countryside may faj.1 victim of sucn abuse of power, 
^he misuse or the power of arrest sometimes causes 
more loss to tne society, then Commission of the offence 
itself . Tne manner in wnicn a police officer makes 
arrests snoula appear fair. It is also snould stxictly 
be told tnat law does not give licence to arrest or to 
searcn persons whenever tne police want to do so. 
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Our democratic constitution recognizes and confers 
certain fundamental rights upon the citizens of this country 
who give a pride place to the constitution in their nearts. 
We seek to free India through the constitution to feed the 
hungry masses/ to cloth the naked millions of men and women 
and to offer an opportunity to the children of this country 
to shape the destiny in accordance with their capacities. 
x'his cherished goal of the constitution is to be realised 
if it secures liberty and assures the dignity of the indivi-
dual. It therefore means that the focal poinr. of Indian 
Constitution is the "dignity of the individual" whicn is 
possible only by tne liberty. The liberty, therefore is the 
most precious and cherished human right. There is therefore 
a close inseparable link between individual liberty and 
individual dignity. 
So this right to liberty is to be safeguarded by 
all the constitutional functionaries including the police 
and the court. The Supreme Court has expended the scope of 
liberty to tne extent that it has become embrassive and all 
pervassive. It therefore includes in its scope every aspect 
of hxoman life. If we make a panoramic review of the deci-
sional worx of the Supreine Court in tne area of personal 
liberty* guaranteed dy .-irw. 21. ..e wouia know tnaz i- has 
1 1 7 
left no j^ arr or human lire untoucned e.g. righc to privacy 
has been acceoted as part of personal liberty in Kharak 
1 • 2 3 
Singh ana Govinda cases/ right to passport in .patwant Sinoh 
4 • * 5 
and i-ianeka, right to speedy trial in M.H. Hoskot and 
6 
Hussainara, right to live with numan dignity in Francis 
7 8 
Coralie and People's Union for i/emocratic Rights. This 
shows the great judicial concernt and anxiety about the civi 
liberties. 
Unfortunately/ when we "try with destiny"/ the 
country's new ruler, did nor make any serious attempt to 
bring tne Police Act and Police x<eguiations in tune with the 
constitutional democracy. Reasons known to the rulers, they 
decided all together to live wi-ch tne Police Raj, The role 
of police stands refined and not changed to that of a police 
9 
in colonial regime. The police still treats the civil 
liberties casually. Tne present political scenerio, full or 
violence and terrorism has posea a new problem to the civil 
liberties. Our new primeminister i'lr, P.V, warismha Rao has 
criticised zhe role of human re^htists. The Killings of so 
1. Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. .^IR 1963 SC 1295 
2. Govinda v. State of :-i.P./ ^IR 1975 SC 1370 
3. Satwant Singn v. f^ssistanr. Bassport Officer/iN'ew Delhi 
rtIR 1967, SC 1836 
4. rianeka Gandhi v. Union of India, A I R 1978 S,C, 597 
5. M.n.Hoskot V. State of i-iaharasntra/nlrt 1973/S.C. 1548 
6. Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary/State of Bihar/ 
r^ IR 1979, S.J. 1360 
7. r 'rancis Coral ie v. Union Ter rz to ry of Delhi/AIR 1981, 
S . C . 7 4 6 
8. people's Union for democratic .-eights v. Union Of India, 
9. xnornas,-'i,;i. 'poixce perrormance :Rhetoric A I K li'a^ , S.C, 1473 
ana Reality, vol.XXVIII,... 97 (ii'89) Social i^ efe.-.ce, 8-i 
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called terrorists by the State is justifiea not only 
by tne police but by our own representative government 
and this all happened in the name or .Tiaintaining unity 
ana integrity of the country . More and more powers are 
conceded to the police, by some or other means. Thus the 
civil liberties of trie citizens have become the first 
casuality. 
The days of laissezfair have over, democratic 
norms of modern welfare state require much flexibility on 
the bareness- of the State, State over the centixries 
and all over tne world have been stri^ -cing a balance 
be-cween indiviaual liberty and goverr-nent control. what 
is tnerefore required is that importance and significance 
of civil liberties should be made an essential part of 
poxice training. The police must be categorically told 
tnat they are not the rctj * bu"c are servant of tne people 
of India, wno are the ultimate political sovereign of 
India, The knowledge of Indian Penal Code, Criminal 
proceaure Code and Eviaence is no longer a suff:icient 
knowledge for the police. The people of India, are now 
well aware and awakened about their rights. The State 
legislature churning out day and day out laws conferring 
upon the helpless and h«ftpless people of the society. 
10. pande, J.C, ' State Control v. Individual Liberty-
Civil c^  i-iilitary Law Journal, Vol. 26 i.-i,3,?, 198 
11 S 
The Supreme Court as the guardian of citizens rights 
has been playing very active role in protecting -chese 
rights. Therefore the police must also know the decisions 
of the Supreme Court and High Courts regarding the civil 
liberties. 
Importantly/ it is therefore forcejly suggested 
tnat: tne state in it's first priority to overnaul the 
entire Police Regulations effecting the civil liberties 
of the people, so that the Indian masses coulc live with 
dignity, based on equality and fraternity as dreamed and 
promised by Gandhi - Nehru and Azad. 
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